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Abstract 
I study Statoil‟s use of international technology transfer (ITT) and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), and ways in which the two business functions interact within Statoil. 
Some reflections are made on how the academic fields of ITT and CSR – both of which are 
extensively studied by scholars – can be seen to overlap. 
My reflections are illustrated with examples of combined ITT and CSR projects from 
three countries of significant importance to Statoil‟s strategy for international growth: Angola, 
Russia and Venezuela. I have interviewed seven Statoil employees and one university 
professor who manages Statoil-funded projects in Venezuela. 
I hypothesise that Statoil will either have or be in the process of formulating explicit 
strategies for the combined use of ITT and CSR; that Statoil‟s recent history as a technology 
recipient will affect its attitudes to technology transfer and knowledge sharing today; and that 
the Norwegian government, as Statoil‟s majority owner, will influence or attempt to influence 
how Statoil conducts its ITT and CSR projects. The first hypothesis is partly confirmed, the 
second is confirmed and the third is refuted. 
Additionally, I discuss selected theoretical frameworks from the two relevant 
academic fields and how compatible they are with the actual situation in Statoil. Most notably 
this concerns Bozeman‟s (2000) suggestions for criteria for measuring technology transfer 
effectiveness; Wang et al‟s (2004) theories of a firm‟s capacity and willingness to transfer 
technology; and the notion, espoused by several scholars within the CSR field, of CSR as a 
voluntary activity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to shed light on how the business functions of international 
technology transfer (ITT) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) coexist and interact 
within the Norwegian petroleum company Statoil. In less than four decades of existence, 
Statoil has developed from relying almost exclusively on foreign know-how to its status today 
as an integrated energy company with industry leading technological capabilities in a number 
of areas, most notably in the exploration and development of deep sea oil and gas fields.
1
 
Simultaneously, an expansion of Statoil‟s geographic horizon has occurred, from the 
Norwegian continental shelf to the global oil and gas stage. While Statoil‟s first ventures 
abroad occurred already from the early 1980‟s, the main thrust of internationalisation traces 
its roots to the alliance Statoil entered with BP in 1990. As of 2010, Statoil is present in 42 
countries on 5 continents (Statoil, 2011a). 
At the most fundamental level, this thesis is inspired by a desire to understand the very 
processes which constitute the transfer of knowledge from one actor to another. Such transfer, 
of course, happens every minute of every day in every country of the world, so a narrowing of 
scope is called for. Three factors were decisive in the choice of Statoil as the topic of study. 
First, whereas the core curriculum of the ESST course is biased towards domestic university-
industry technology transfer, I wanted to study how technology and technological know-how 
move across borders. Statoil is large enough to have well organised strategic processes related 
to ITT, and has a sufficiently international profile for it to present itself as an interesting 
object of study in this regard.  
Second, as a former history student, I wanted to investigate how contemporary 
phenomena can at least partially be explained by events in the past, in this case the 
development of the Norwegian petroleum innovation sector in the 1970‟s and 1980‟s. Once a 
                                                 
1
 In recent years, the oil business has also displayed increasing interest in ultra-deep waters, e.g. waters of more 
than 1,500 metres depth. This is an area in which Statoil cannot be said to have industry leading competences. 
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net recipient of technological know-how, Statoil now has a knowledge base which it actively 
seeks to utilise as an asset when competing with other firms to obtain exploration licences and 
operatorships. How is Statoil‟s use of its technological knowledge base today influenced by 
its history, bearing in mind that some of the people who learnt the trade in a time when Statoil 
was dependent on foreign know-how still work for the company? Third, the Norwegian 
government owns two thirds of Statoil, and I found it relevant to search for signs of 
governmental influence on Statoil‟s approach to ITT. Finally, I wanted to find a novel 
approach to technology transfer, and I believe I‟ve done so in highlighting the interaction 
between the business functions of ITT and CSR. While there exists a large body of academic 
literature on each of these topics, the ways in which the two interact and influence each other 
are hitherto relatively unexplored. 
The research behind this thesis aims to answer three research questions. Before I 
started gathering empirical data, I made a broad assumption about how each of the research 
questions would be answered, and I then conducted interviews in order to confirm or refute 
my hypothesises. The research questions with their corresponding hypothesis are as follows: 
R1: What are the unique features of projects which Statoil initiated or 
participates in and which combine elements of corporate social responsibility 
and international technology transfer? 
H1: Statoil employees will consider ITT an efficient way to meet CSR targets. 
There will be a clear strategy within Statoil on how to employ ITT in a CSR 
context. 
R2: How does Statoil‟s relatively recent history as a technology recipient 
influence the firm‟s attitudes to international technology transfer today? 
11 
 
 
 
H2: Statoil employees will be conscious about their company‟s history and 
eager to contribute to international technology transfer. 
R3: Given the Norwegian government‟s ambition that state owned companies 
should take a leading role in promoting corporate social responsibility, in what 
ways does the government influence or attempt to influence Statoil‟s policies 
for corporate social responsibility and international technology transfer? 
H3: Government bureaucrats and politicians will have specific expectations to 
how Statoil meets its CSR targets. Statoil will be actively encouraged by 
government actors to engage in ITT. 
After a discussion on methodology in Chapter 2, I will introduce the academic fields 
of CSR and ITT in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 includes a discussion on how to define the respective 
terms and explains the main theories I use to analyze the empirical findings. In Chapter 4, I 
make use of interviews with Statoil employees and representatives of partner institutions, as 
well as document analysis, to shed light on three programmes which Statoil administers or 
funds and which combine elements of ITT and CSR. Chapter 5 gives an analysis of how the 
empirical evidence answers the research questions and how it fits with the selected theoretical 
contributions. Finally, Chapter 6 sums up the findings, discusses weaknesses and limitations 
with this thesis and offers suggestions for further research. 
12 
 
 
  
13 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Methodology and sources 
2.1. A qualitative and deductive approach designed as a case study 
The research I have conducted is of an exploratory kind, more than explanatory or descriptive. 
Given the limited time available for research, the difficulty of getting full and unfettered 
access to relevant information controlled by Statoil and the fact that there is no pre-existing 
theoretical framework which fits my exact topic of research, I have found it sensible to limit 
my ambitions to providing an initial overview of what the combination of CSR and ITT could 
mean for business and how researchers could approach the topic. In scope, I have chosen to 
limit myself to describe and analyse three projects, rather than attempting to cover the full 
range of Statoil‟s CSR and ITT projects.  
I have used a deductive, qualitative methodology. It is deductive in the sense that I 
started with a number of assumptions or hypotheses on how CSR and ITT would function 
within Statoil and then confronted my assumptions with examples from the real world to test 
their validity. I also made use of some suggested theories from the respective academic fields 
of CSR and ITT and investigated how they fit with the actual situation in Statoil. The 
methodology is qualitative in the sense that I have only to a very limited extent sought to 
provide exact measurements of the processes and outcomes of CSR and ITT. Rather, I aspire 
to the greatest possible richness of description of the few projects I have investigated, 
covering social mechanisms, actors‟ beliefs, and influences on CSR and ITT from Statoil‟s 
history and its socio-political context.  
There are a number of reasons why I consider a qualitative approach as best suited to 
answer my research questions. First, it has been pointed out that technology transfer as a 
system is “continuous and dynamic, rather than discrete and static” (Calantone et al., 1990: 
27). Second, as for CSR, my aim in this thesis is not so much to examine quantifiable data on 
expenditure, number of employees or number of projects, as it is to learn more about what 
14 
 
CSR means to Statoil‟s employees and how they see CSR as an integrated part of their 
company‟s business. Finally, it seems unreasonable to assume that a firm‟s strategies are 
developed independently of all external influence. Implicit in my assumption that the 
Norwegian government somehow plays a role in how Statoil enacts its CSR policies, is an 
assumption of some sort of social pressure being exercised on the firm, and I wanted to 
qualitatively examine where this pressure is pronounced and how it is perceived.  
I have designed my research as a case study of the company Statoil with three specific 
sub-cases – namely Statoil‟s operations in Angola, Northwest Russia and Venezuela – to 
serve as examples of how CSR and ITT are carried out within the company. George and 
Bennett (2005) provide useful advice for how to get the most out of a case study, some of 
which has inspired my work. It should be pointed out, however, that whereas George and 
Bennett are interested in case studies as a method to develop new scientific theories, my 
primary target is rather to give a description of how CSR and ITT coexist within Statoil, and I 
have very limited ambitions for how generalisable my findings will prove to be with regards 
to other companies. I believe that it would be pretentious to put forth a complete theoretical 
framework on the simple basis of three cases from within one single company, but I still 
believe that the description of these three cases can serve as a useful first foray into the 
merging of two hitherto separated academic fields. 
The design phase of this project was the one where I most closely followed George 
and Bennett‟s recommendations. The phase is constituted of five distinct tasks (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 73-88). The first stresses the necessity of a clear specification of the problem 
and the research objective, which I have done through formulating research questions with 
corresponding hypotheses. The second task consists of specifying dependent and independent 
variables to be explained or predicted. In this thesis, business projects in Statoil which 
combine elements of international technology transfer and corporate social responsibility 
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constitute the dependent variable or, in more common terms, the object of study. The 
independent variables, or the phenomena expected to have an influence on the object of study, 
are first and foremost Statoil‟s history and the Norwegian government‟s ownership of Statoil, 
but also theories from the respective academic fields, as described in Chapter 3. 
The third task of case study research design is to select cases. I have chosen combined 
CSR and ITT projects in Angola, Russia and Venezuela, because these projects are explicitly 
mentioned on Statoil‟s website (Statoil, 2011c, Statoil, 2008a) .2 George and Bennett warn 
about the danger of selection bias when choosing cases to study, or in other words, that the 
researcher can be tempted to select only cases which appear to fit well with the predetermined 
hypothesis (George and Bennett, 2005: 22). When selecting the three cases I present here, I 
had no knowledge of how they would fit with my initial assumptions, other than the fact that 
they all include elements of both CSR and ITT, which is of course a prerequisite for sensibly 
including them in the study. It is necessary to stress, however, that the findings I present 
should not be interpreted as generalisable to a wider class of events. They remain valid for the 
sole purpose of describing how CSR and ITT interact within Statoil, and can only 
hypothetically be valid for other companies as well. The description of how specific 
mechanisms work can still be highly valuable, especially if, as is the case here, little previous 
research on the topic exists. At the same time, I am aware that I can at best expect to say 
something useful about whether and how a variable has influence on the outcome of a 
process, and little or nothing about how much it mattered (George and Bennett, 2005: 25). 
Fourth, a case study research design should include an idea of how variance in the 
variables will be described. The authors warn about an over-simplified description of 
variance, for example with only two possible outcomes such as “success” and “failure”. I will 
attempt to give as rich as possible an explanation of Statoil‟s ITT and CSR projects, and I 
                                                 
2
 The sustainability report of 2008 also mentions projects in Algeria and Nigeria, but Statoil is today 
substantially more committed to the projects in Russia and Venezuela. 
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believe that, having interviewed both people with first-hand experience from projects and 
people with coordinative oversight over several projects, I have gained a nuanced 
understanding of how these projects function. Finally, George and Bennett espouse a clear 
formulation of data requirements and general questions. By that they mean that questions 
asked during interviews should not put words in the mouth of the interviewee, but allow him 
or her to give a personal interpretation of events. It is also important that the same general 
questions are asked of each interviewee, so as to open up for comparison between cases. 
During interviews, I let the interviewee speak as freely as possible, in order to keep open the 
opportunity to gain new insight that I hadn‟t predicted in the preparatory phase. Still, a core 
set of questions was asked of all interviewees (see Appendix II). 
2.2. Interviews 
In total, I have conducted seven interviews and received a written response from an eighth 
informant to questions similar to those asked in interviews. For each of the three cases I 
describe, I have received input from one representative with hands-on experience from the 
country in question. Morten Fejerskov has worked for Statoil Angola with knowledge transfer 
and technology cooperation; Benedikt Henriksen has several years of experience from CSR 
and ITT projects in Northwest Russia; and Professor Michael Golan is the project manager for 
the Norwegian University of Science and Technology‟s operational role in Statoil-funded 
CSR and ITT programmes in Venezuela.  
In addition to these three, I have interviewed five Statoil employees who hold or used 
to hold coordinative positions related to CSR or technology management. Rolf Magne Larsen 
was formerly head of Statoil‟s division for International exploration and production, 
colloquially known as INT
3
, and later led the division responsible for CSR and country 
                                                 
3
 In a subsequent reorganisation, the old INT was split in two new units, namely Development and Production 
International (DPI) and Development and Production North America (DPNA). 
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analysis; Ilse Castellanos currently leads the CSR division of Statoil DPI
4
; Simon Hayes 
works with technology management and used to work in a unit called International Industrial 
Development which attempted to coordinate the strategic use of technology transfer; Hege 
Ebeltoft used to be the technology manager in INT; and Hans-Aasmund Frisak is responsible 
for governmental contacts of relevance to Statoil‟s international projects. 
All in all, I find that the eight respondents provide a body of information which can be 
said to be reliable. They work in different departments with different projects. Some of them 
have a primarily technological background; some are more focused on CSR. One is not 
employed by Statoil and thus provides a useful outsider‟s vantage point on how Statoil works. 
However, given the third research question, which concerns the Norwegian government‟s real 
or perceived influence, it would doubtless have been useful to include an interview with a 
representative from the Ownership Section of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. Written 
contact was made with the section in June 2011, but was not met with a reply. I intended to 
reiterate the contact after the summer holidays, but as the terrorist attacks in Oslo in July 2011 
struck the ministry very hard, I chose to desist from further attempts. I still believe that the 
answers I received from Mr Frisak cover this research question to a satisfactory level. The 
information Mr Frisak provided was of such a kind that I do not expect that the ministry 
would find reason to deny any of the content, nor did I find it to contrast with what any of the 
other respondents within Statoil said. 
One possible criticism of relying so heavily on interviews is that, by virtue of being an 
interpersonal social contact arena, interviews may bring about reflexivity, or that the 
interviewee gives answers he or she believes the interviewer wants to hear. I cannot give a 
waterproof guarantee that reflexivity has not occurred and I know for certain that, regardless 
of whether or not the information provided has been given a favourable twist by the 
                                                 
4
 See previous footnote. 
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interviewee, some information has not been given at all. Most notably, this concerns 
information deemed as competition sensitive. Still, my experience of the interview situation 
was that, even though I was treated with respect and a generally welcoming attitude, there 
was still a tacit perception of a social hierarchy in which I, as a student, was not in any way 
seen by the interviewee as a threat and that, accordingly, he or she spoke candidly and did not 
hesitate to interrupt or correct me. Consequently, I believe that reflexivity has been relatively 
limited in the interviews conducted for this thesis and I also believe that I have treated the 
interviewees‟ information with the necessary criticism in the analytical chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Definitions, literature review and theory 
Just about every scientific article on ITT or CSR either proposes a definition of its own or 
discusses previously suggested definitions. With so many definitions available, I do not 
consider it constructive to put forth yet more, nor will I choose specific definitions from the 
bundle and stick rigorously to them for the remainder of the discussion. If that were to be my 
approach, I would risk excluding projects which Statoil itself refers to as ITT or CSR from the 
discussion, because, as we shall see, there is far from complete compatibility between 
definitions put forth by academics and the way the concepts are understood in everyday 
business life. In this chapter I therefore present and discuss a selection of proposed 
definitions, and in the analytical chapter I attempt to demonstrate how different ITT and CSR 
projects in Statoil correspond or conflict with the definitions. I also attempt, in this chapter, to 
give a general introduction to the relevant academic fields through a literature review. 
3.1. International technology transfer (ITT) 
3.1.1. Definitions 
To begin with international technology transfer, which is the academic field most closely 
related to the STS curriculum, I find that the available definitions are often biased towards the 
manufacturing sector or exceedingly concentrated on the commercial outcomes of technology 
transfer, and I have considered it useful to critically investigate what is meant by each of the 
three words in the term “international technology transfer”. 
“International” is the most straightforward of the three. ITT – and therefore this thesis 
– is concerned solely with the movement of technology or technological know-how across 
national borders. Statoil has extensive cooperation with Norwegian universities, most notably 
with the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), but insofar as this 
cooperation is conducted with the aim of developing technology for use within Norway, it 
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will not be treated here. Yet, Norwegian universities also play a significant role in Statoil‟s 
international technology transfer projects, as will be clearly demonstrated. 
Moving on to the word “technology”, it has been noted that “the most common view 
of technology is “a tool”, and then discussions proceed as to just what type of tool qualifies as 
technology” (Bozeman, 2000: 68). The notion of a “tool” is useful in underlining that 
“technology” is by no means limited to mere blueprints or machinery, but can incorporate an 
array of techniques, managerial skills and even societal structures which facilitate the pursuit 
of efficiency and financial profits. Technology transfer can just as well be defined free from 
any financial implications as “the process by which science and technology are transferred 
from one individual or group to another that incorporates this new technology into a new or 
improved process, product, system or way of doing something” (Singh, 2003: 2). In either 
case, it is clear that knowledge must always be diffused along with technology in the form of 
physical objects, or else the physical objects cannot be put to use. 
During the work on this thesis, I have moved further and further from an initial 
assumption that “technology transfer” as conducted by Statoil would primarily mean selling, 
donating or explaining the functioning of specific pieces of machinery, to an awareness that 
Statoil‟s ITT programmes are often directed towards a general strengthening of human capital 
through different educational programmes. The understanding of technology as more complex 
and dynamic than a simple bundle of artefacts was staunchly defended by a group of 
researchers who convened in the mid-1980s to stake out a new line of research on technology 
as a socially constructed system. The group saw technological systems as built up by 
components which include, but are not limited to, physical artefacts, organisations, scientific 
components, legislative artefacts and natural resources, and which interact and affect each 
other in a number of ways. In this school of thought, commonly referred to as SCOT, which is 
an acronym for the Social Construction of Technology, technology is defined as “problem 
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solving usually concerned with the reordering of the material world to make it more 
productive of goods and services” (Hughes, 1987: 53). 
 Finally, the word “transfer” is relatively unproblematic, provided that one does not 
understand it to mean something being “free” or given away from one party to the other. In 
fact, the ITT projects which Statoil is involved in often obliges both parties to incur 
significant costs, not just financial costs, but also costs in the form of use of time. The 
discussion on costs notwithstanding, a notion of “movement” is definitely present in the 
transfer term; some entity must inevitably be delocalized in order for “transfer” to be an 
accurate description of the event. Furthermore, it is important to note that “transfer” is not a 
one-way, one-step, instantaneous process, but can involve several leaps between transferor 
and recipient, and also a prolonged period of adjustment to a new setting before the 
technology is stabilized. Hughes observed that “because a [technological] system usually has 
embodied in it characteristics suiting it for survival in a particular time and place, manifold 
difficulties often arise in transfer at another time or to a different environment” (Hughes, 
1987: 67). 
The petroleum industry is unique in many ways, for example in that it is an extractive 
industry, which means that the site of production of its core product – raw petroleum – is 
predetermined by this resource‟s location. Moreover, the industry is dominated by very big 
companies and is characterized by a potential for huge profits and massive technological 
reorientation of the economy of a country in which petroleum resources are discovered. 
Among other things, this means that government is likely to be heavily involved in the 
industry, as is inter alia illustrated by the fact that the Norwegian government owns two thirds 
of Statoil. Because of its specificities, it would be useful to have more available definitions 
directly targeted at the petroleum industry in particular, but scholarly work on technology 
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transfer in the petroleum industry is not abundant. One valuable contribution has been given 
by Zakariya, who explicitly treats the question of what “transfer” should mean: 
As far as petroleum operations are concerned, the importation of the necessary 
tools and human skills by the foreign operator for his own purposes does not 
constitute in and of itself any real transfer of technology. (…) Ideally, a real 
transfer of technology lies in the ability of the developing country to purchase 
or hire directly the most advanced technical means of petroleum exploration 
and development, if and when it so wishes, at a reasonable price. It also lies 
above all, in developing the mental skills of its citizens to utilize these 
technical means effectively, alone if they choose to do so (Zakariya, 1982: 
208). 
Such a view of the transfer need not in and of itself have implications for how Statoil 
conducts its ITT programmes, because the interests of a company clearly do not necessarily 
equate the interests of a country. But since we have noted how government usually takes a 
strong interest in the petroleum sector, and assuming that governments in countries where 
Statoil operates adhere to Zakariya‟s recommendations, Statoil should expect to meet 
requirements that their ITT programmes concentrate heavily on improvement of indigenous 
human resources. In fact, one could easily imagine a conflict of interest between national 
governments wanting to increase the skills of the workers in its petroleum sector, thus 
increasing the autonomy of the sector with regards to foreign firms, and foreign firms wanting 
to capitalise on their potentially lucrative knowledge advance. 
3.1.2. Literature review and theoretical background 
Since one of the research questions in this thesis seeks to identify ways in which Statoil is 
influenced by history, it is necessary to give a brief overview of how the Norwegian 
petroleum sector developed from the first discovery of oil on the Norwegian continental shelf 
in the late 1960s and up until today. It is noteworthy that although no Norwegian company 
initially possessed the technological capabilities necessary to operate independently on the 
continental shelf, the legislative framework accompanying the development of the sector was 
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set up so as to allow for the maximum rate of return on petroleum resources directly to the 
Norwegian state. The Norwegian state bureaucracy already had experience from building 
institutions for the exploitation of natural resources, after the country‟s hydropower sector had 
been developed at the end of the 19
th
 and beginning of the 20
th
 century. Furthermore, Norway 
already played a part in the international petroleum industry, albeit indirectly, as around 20% 
of the global tanker fleet was registered in Norway and Norwegian shipyards were busy 
building ever more freighters (Engen, 2009). 
Still, the nascent Norwegian petroleum sector was completely reliant on foreign know-
how: “There was no mention of an independent Norwegian investment in technology, and 
special competence had to be imported. The central issue was to establish appropriate 
connections where the Norwegians could participate and thereby gain profitable experiences” 
(Engen, 2009: 183). Moreover, it is worth noting that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
Norwegian authorities were genuinely concerned about the amount of foreign currency 
available to the country, and they worried that an expansive domestic petroleum industry 
would hinder the inflow of currency which would come about as a result of investments by 
foreign oil companies (Ryggvik, 1997: 30-31). Established in 1972, Statoil therefore initially 
functioned more as an intermediary agent between the know-how of international oil 
companies and existing Norwegian industrial competencies, than as an independent company. 
Engen points out that Statoil, along with the rest of the Norwegian petroleum industry, 
owes much of their technological competences of today to the system of “goodwill points” 
which operated from 1979 and which, when exploration licences were awarded, gave 
advantages to foreign companies having engaged in technology transfer to the benefit of 
Norwegian firms. The start of production on the giant Statfjord and Gullfaks fields – which 
were operated by Statoil after a development phase in which Statoil was trained by Mobil 
(Statfjord) and Esso (Gullfaks) – can be seen as demarcations of when Statoil fully acquired 
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the capacity to independently develop and operate oil and gas fields (Ryggvik, 2010: 43, 109-
110). 
Aside from historical accounts, articles which treat the topic of technology transfer in 
a more general manner have proven to be of more relevance to this thesis than the few I have 
been able to identify which treat the petroleum sector specifically. In their literature review, 
Reddy and Zhao (1990) sort scholarly work on technology transfer in three broad categories 
according to whether they focus on the host country perspective, the home country 
perspective or the transaction perspective. In the host country perspective, Reddy and Zhao 
assert that the acquisition of a new technology does not automatically entail proper 
assimilation and integration of the new technology into the host firm or host country. 
Consequently, the costs incurred by technology transfer extend beyond the costs of the 
technology itself and are affected by geographic distances, communication needs, the nature 
of the technology to be transferred, as well as industry and country characteristics. Indeed, the 
authors seem sceptical to how much real benefit a host society can expect to gain from 
technology transfer initiated by multinational corporations (MNC), since MNCs easily fall for 
the temptation to charge excessive prices and display what the authors dub “technological 
arrogance”. It is pointed out that “the choice of technology by the MNCs seldom favors the 
social objectives of the LDC
5
 host countries. Numerous other studies support the argument 
that MNCs actually do little to adapt their technology to conditions in LDCs” (Reddy and 
Zhao, 1990). An observation which is relevant for the petroleum industry is that LDCs could 
have reason to be sceptical towards unfettered imports of capital-intensive technology – 
which is precisely the sort of technology which dominates the petroleum industry – as it may 
have effects on employment and income distribution. 
                                                 
5
 LDC = least developed country 
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When it comes to the home country perspective, Reddy and Zhao highlight a 
controversy in the scholarly debate on whether ITT is a disadvantage for home countries as it 
dilutes their technological lead or a benefit because it facilitates access to new markets. When 
discussing technology transfer initiated by MNCs like Statoil, it is of course natural to assume 
that there is a strategic motivation behind such projects, precisely in that they aim to open up 
new markets. Knowing, however, that Norwegian authorities only a few decades ago put 
down significant efforts in building up and protecting indigenous technological capabilities in 
the Norwegian petroleum sector, it appears relevant to search for signs of worry among 
decision-makers that technology transfer could take some of the edge off Norway‟s 
technological lead.  
Articles which primarily study the transaction perspective have taken an interest in 
explaining exactly what is being transferred in the process, or what technology is. In this 
respect, it once again becomes clear that rather than the sale or transfer of blueprints or 
functioning machinery, the transfer of specialized know-how is usually the object of interest 
for articles on international technology transfer. As will become clear in this thesis, when 
Statoil talks about technology transfer, it is practically never a question of transferring nuts-
and-bolts technology, so it could be claimed that knowledge sharing would be a more fitting 
term. 
Furthermore, Reddy and Zhao confirm that the very term “transfer” would be 
problematic if it were perceived as the description of a costless delocalization of technology, 
because actual technology transfer often comes with significant costs for both the transferring 
and the acquiring party. “Costs” in this respect are more than financial costs, as Reddy and 
Zhao observe that “the transfer of technology, in most cases, calls for a sustained relationship 
between two enterprises over a period of time” (1990: 295). It thus becomes clear that 
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technology transfer should not be treated as a quick-fix solution but something that both 
parties need to commit to over time. 
A model for measuring the effectiveness of technology transfer – the Contingent 
Effectiveness Model – has been elaborated by Bozeman and includes six different criteria for 
evaluating effectiveness. Measured by what Bozeman calls the “out-the-door” criterion, a 
technology transfer will be effective by the very fact that it has occurred, namely by one entity 
having received technology provided by another. The market impact criterion assesses if the 
transfer has lead to changes in a firm‟s market share or improvements of the profit margin, 
whereas the economic development criterion gauges similar effects on a country or region 
rather than on a single firm. The political reward criterion measures goodwill a company 
gains from governments or national oil companies in the wake of technology transfer. The 
opportunity cost criterion assesses whether the resources spent on technology transfer could 
have been put to better use elsewhere in the organisation and, finally, the human capital 
criterion measures the effect of technology transfer on the skills of workers in the host 
country economy (Bozeman, 2000: 644-649). A major assumption of the model is that no 
single criterion makes much sense by itself. Rather, all evaluations must take into account 
several of the proposed criteria. 
Wang et al (2004) studied knowledge transfer from MNCs to Chinese firms in which 
the MNCs held shares. Knowledge is treated as a company‟s most strategically important 
resource, and the authors conclude that the amount of knowledge contributed by the parent 
company is affected by that company‟s capacity to transfer and willingness to transfer. Since 
it specifically treats China, parts of Wang et al‟s article are of little interest to this thesis. In 
light of the research question concerning historical influences on Statoil‟s present technology 
transfer activities, I have nevertheless found it useful to examine how different technology 
transfer stakeholders perceive Statoil‟s capacity and willingness to transfer knowledge. 
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The parent company‟s capacity to transfer, according to Wang et al, is primarily 
affected by its knowledge base and the level of competence of its employees expatriated to 
China. The first factor seems somewhat evident, as the more sophisticated a firm‟s knowledge 
base is, the more likely it is that what is actually being transferred will be of high quality. 
Expatriates‟ competences are particularly important for tacit knowledge, because “when the 
underlying knowledge is tacit or the objective of the transfer is to change the mindsets of the 
recipients, significant learning would not take place without the presence of expatriates” 
(Wang et al., 2004: 174-175). The ideal expatriate, as sketched by Wang et al, must first and 
foremost possess superior managerial and technical skills. But they must also be culturally 
sensitive and committed to sharing knowledge. Language skills are seen as helpful in 
achieving the objective of cultural sensitivity. 
The parents‟ willingness to transfer is affected by the subsidiary‟s importance to the 
MNC, the ownership structure and, in the case of joint ventures, the relationship with the 
partner (Wang et al., 2004: 175). Again, the first factor is probably the easiest to accept. It 
seems only natural that a mother firm will be more intent on boosting the skills of a subsidiary 
if the subsidiary has high sales, than if its economic activity is relatively minor. With regards 
to ownership structure, Wang et al observe that wholly owned subsidiaries are easier targets 
for transfer than joint venture partners or subsidiaries thereof. This is first because the mother 
firm can decide exactly what to transfer to its wholly owned subsidiary and how much to 
spend on transfer, second because it need not worry about technology being stolen, and third 
because the mother firm can reap all the economic benefits from technology transfer on its 
own. In the case of joint ventures, where risks of unauthorised technology appropriation by 
the partner are higher, a good relation between the partners is found to increase both the 
likelihood that knowledge transfer will take place and the quality of transfer. 
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3.2. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
3.2.1. Definitions 
Since it first came into widespread use in the 1960‟s and 1970‟s, CSR has become something 
of a trend word within innovation and management literature, to the extent that a clear 
definition seems more difficult to discern the more one reads. It is seemingly easy to explain 
in a commonsensical way: CSR is when companies try to do some good for the wider society 
without expecting financial remuneration. But without further specification, this explanation 
would allow for an enormous amount of a firm‟s activities to be labelled as CSR. Is the 
promotion of gender equality CSR? Or paying fair wages even in times of high 
unemployment? Or what about a case where a firm sells a product and gives some of the 
income to a cause perceived as “noble” but at the same time makes a substantial profit itself? 
Marrewijk devoted an entire article to the problem of defining CSR, and actually 
concluded that a “one solution fits all” approach should be abandoned and that “each 
company should choose – from the many opportunities – which concept and definition is the 
best option, matching the company‟s aims and intentions and aligned with the company‟s 
strategy, as a response to the circumstances in which it operates” (Marrewijk, 2003: 96). He 
still goes some way in explaining a broad understanding of the term. The question, he says, is 
how to name the notion of a “more humane, more ethical and a more transparent way of doing 
business”, and he proposes that “in general, corporate sustainability6 and CSR refer to 
company activities – voluntary by definition – demonstrating the inclusion of social and 
environmental concerns in business operations and in interactions with stakeholders” 
(Marrewijk, 2003: 102). Even though this is a good general description of CSR, one could 
still direct criticism towards the assumption that business activities are always voluntary. On a 
very fundamental level it is true, of course, that starting and running a business is voluntary. 
                                                 
6
 I shall not dwell upon Marrewijk‟s separation of the two terms “corporate sustainability” and “corporate social 
responsibility”, as they are sufficiently similar for me to consider it admissible to use CSR as an umbrella term. 
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However, we shall see that when Statoil sets up business in a new country, it often faces 
contractual requirements to engage in certain activities which are later reported as “social 
investments” in the company‟s sustainability report, even though the activities can hardly be 
described as voluntary. 
Another type of definition which does not arrive at an entirely accurate description of 
Statoil‟s approach to CSR, stresses that CSR must in some ways be detached from the 
“interests” of the firm. For example, McWilliams and Siegel define CSR as “actions that 
appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required 
by law. This definition underscores that, to us, CSR means going beyond obeying the law” 
(2001: 117). In fact, both the assumptions of this definition – that CSR must move beyond the 
firm‟s interests and that it must do more than simply obey the law – can be criticised. After a 
closer look at the real world, it becomes clear that CSR is probably more often than not in the 
interests of the firm, or at least assumed by the firm to be in its interests. What the concept of 
corporate social responsibility underlines is precisely that economic activity need not be a 
zero-sum game where one firm‟s progress necessarily causes another economic actor‟s 
decline. In fact, the very purpose of CSR can be said to be the search for ways in which a firm 
and its surrounding environment can benefit from the firm‟s activities. 
Matten and Moon (2008) provide an interesting comment on the notion that CSR must 
mean to move beyond compliance with the law. In a comparative study of attitudes to CSR in 
Europe and the United States, they conclude that if American companies seemingly engage in 
more CSR-related activities than their European counterparts, this can be explained by the 
smaller role government plays in the US as compared to Europe. Because of smaller 
government, companies are left with more responsibility for their employees, which gives US 
companies the opportunity to label for example fair wages and the provision of health care as 
“CSR”. This does not mean that European companies are less concerned with employee 
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benefits; it simply means that in Europe, such provisions are to a larger extent included in 
legislation and therefore outside the scope of discretionary managerial decisions. Matten and 
Moon thus distinguish between “explicit” and “implicit” CSR, respectively “corporate 
policies that assume and articulate responsibility for some societal interests” and 
“corporations‟ role within the wider formal and informal institutions for society‟s interests 
and concerns” (Matten and Moon, 2008: 409). In this respect, Matten and Moon‟s definition 
can be seen as a broadening of McWilliams and Siegel‟s, because the latter does not include 
the former‟s notion of „implicit CSR‟. 
Since we are studying CSR in Statoil, as well as real or perceived attempts by the 
Norwegian government to influence how Statoil approaches CSR, it is necessary to mention 
how these two actors understand the concept of CSR. Statoil operates with a three-point 
corporate policy on social responsibility, which states: 
We are committed to contributing to sustainable development based on our 
core activities in the countries in which we operate by: 
 Making decisions based on how they affect our interests and the interests of 
the societies around us 
 Ensuring transparency, anti-corruption and respect for human rights and 
labour standards, and 
 Contributing to local content in our projects by developing skills and 
opportunities in the societies in which we operate (Statoil, 2010c). 
In this context, it is particularly worth noting the third bullet point; skills development 
in local communities is indeed a central aspect of combined CSR and technology transfer in 
Statoil. 
As for the Norwegian government, it takes the position that  
CSR involves companies integrating social and environmental concerns into 
their day-to-day operations, as well as in their dealings with stakeholders. CSR 
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means what companies do on a voluntary basis beyond complying with 
existing legislation and rules in the country in which they are operating (MFA, 
2009: 8). 
We can see how this explanation of CSR does not include any specific references to 
neither technology transfer nor knowledge sharing, and we can also note the emphasis on 
voluntary activities and the understanding, similar to McWilliams and Siegel‟s, of CSR as 
moving beyond compliance with legislation. 
3.2.2. Literature review and theoretical background 
Several authors have noted how CSR has resurfaced as a scholarly discipline during the past 
decade after a first wave of interest in the 1960‟s and 70‟s and a subsequent drop in interest 
during the 1980‟s (Hockerts and Morsing, 2008, Marrewijk, 2003). The renewed prominence 
of CSR in management and innovation literature can be ascribed to mounting concern about 
the consequences of globalisation and a desire to hold multinational firms accountable to a 
wider array of stakeholders than simply their own shareholders. Indeed, an important question 
pertaining to CSR is to decide to whom or to which actors organisations are responsible. 
Suggestions have included the shareholder approach, as expressed by Friedman (1970); the 
stakeholder approach, formulated by Freeman (1984); and the societal approach, according to 
which companies are an integral part of society as a whole and therefore are responsible to it.  
The main line of argument in Friedman‟s article is that the social responsibility of 
business is a problematic concept, since only persons can be responsible and “business” is, at 
best, an artificial person. Business‟ purpose is to generate income to their shareholders, argues 
Friedman, and the only socially responsible initiatives that he will accept from business are 
the ones with clear self-serving motives; for example, he does admit that a corporation which 
is a major employer in a small community can gain from providing amenities to that 
community or from helping it improve its government. 
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R. Edward Freeman introduced the term stakeholder management, which of late has 
come to dominate the academic discourse on CSR. “The aim of stakeholder management is 
(...) to analyze how a company can serve its customers and be lucrative while also serving its 
other stakeholders such as suppliers, employees, and communities” (Hockerts and Morsing, 
2008: 6). While serving other stakeholders may seem like a noble thing for a firm to do, the 
stakeholder approach to CSR is just as much about a firm‟s desire to familiarise itself with an 
array of stakeholders‟ opinions and to some extent exert influence over them. Stakeholder 
management is a term which appeared frequently in interviews I conducted with Statoil 
employees, suggesting that this line of thinking carries strong influence within Statoil. 
As for the societal approach, Marrewijk (2003) provides a philosophical argument in 
defence of CSR. He assumes that reality is composed of elements which he refers to as holons 
and which are neither completely independent – whole – nor completely dependent – part. 
Holons express their wholeness through self-assertion and self-preservation, capacities which 
make up the agency of the holon. On the other hand, participatory, bonding and joining 
tendencies make up the holon‟s communion, which expresses its partness. Bearing this 
framework in mind, Marrewijk explains the emergence of CSR as a re-equilibration of an 
imbalance in the global wholeness which has occurred as multinational companies have put 
too much weight on their agency to the detriment of their communion. “As can be expected 
from theoretical exercises, countervailing power is emerging in the growth, both in number 
and impact, of the (global) civil society” (Marrewijk, 2003: 98). 
In an attempt to circumvent the discussion of the moral rationale behind CSR, 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) suggest that there is an “ideal” amount of CSR for a company 
to provide and that managers can determine this amount through cost-benefit analysis. Their 
article applies a theory-of-the-firm perspective, “based on the presumption that managers of 
publicly held firms usually attempt to maximize shareholder wealth, with a vigorous “market 
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for corporate control” as the primary control mechanism” (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001: 18). 
They hypothesize that demand for CSR comes from two sources: consumers and other 
stakeholders. In sum, McWilliams and Siegel propose that managers should treat decisions 
regarding CSR just as they treat other investment decisions. They also claim to have 
demonstrated that, although companies which provide CSR will have higher costs than other 
firms, the relationship between CSR and profits will be neutral, or in other words: a firm 
which increases its spending on CSR will, in the long run, see neither an increase nor a 
reduction in their profits. 
In a guest editors‟ introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Management 
Studies devoted to the topic of CSR, McWilliams et al summarise the most important 
contributions to the CSR literature thus far and the main approaches scholars have taken 
(McWilliams et al., 2006). In addition to Friedman‟s shareholder approach and Freeman‟s 
stakeholder approach, McWilliams et al mention stewardship theory, according to which 
managers have a moral obligation to “do the right thing”; strategic leadership theory, which 
postulates that under certain conditions, such as transition, managers will employ CSR 
strategically; and the resource-based view-of-the-firm theory, under which firms are bundles 
of imperfectly mobile resources which – if valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable – 
can constitute a competitive advantage. A reputation for being socially responsible can be one 
such resource. The authors stress CSR‟s potential as a differentiator of products otherwise 
difficult to differentiate and it would hardly be exaggerated to say that oil and gas, Statoil‟s 
main products, are very homogenous products, in the sense that they are very difficult to 
differentiate. The authors further suggest a conceptual distinction between strategic, coerced 
and altruistic CSR and point to an article in the same special issue which suggests that both a 
firm and the wider society are better off when the approach to CSR is strategic, rather than 
coerced (Husted and de Jesus Salazar, 2006). 
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In a literature review meant to provide theoretical grounding for research to be 
undertaken by the Nordic Centre on Corporate Responsibility, Hockerts and Morsing (2008) 
note that CSR has become such a popular theme in management literature that it can safely be 
referred to as “the latest management fad”. At the same time, they claim, most firms which 
keep CSR in their corporate toolbox seem to think of CSR as a means to reduce risk rather 
than a means to drive innovation, and it is therefore questionable if CSR can really be said to 
be fully integrated into business processes. Four different levels of analysis of CSR are 
identified: An institutional level, where CSR is viewed as a strategic tool firms adopt to gain 
legitimacy or, as the authors put it, a “licence to operate”; an individual level, on which 
managerial discretion and an individual desire to do good leads to development of CSR 
policies; an organizational level, which sees CSR as a tool for stakeholder dialogue; and 
finally a global level, where global sustainable development is seen as the goal and CSR as 
one of the tools.  
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Chapter 4: Empirical findings 
4.1. Statoil’s approach to technology management 
Before the merger between Statoil and Hydro in 2007, Statoil INT asked for a business unit 
which was to have industrial development as its core activity. Accordingly, International 
Industrial Development (IID) was established through the merger and existed within the new 
StatoilHydro from 2007 to 2011. The purpose of this unit was to attempt to strengthen and 
coordinate Statoil‟s approach to local content and capacity building. As of today, Statoil is 
engaged in six bilateral technology cooperation agreements (TCA) with other national oil 
companies (NOC) – respectively in Angola, Brazil, China, Mexico, Russia and Venezuela – 
but IID has been shut down and country managers again operate completely independently 
with regards to initiatives to new TCAs.  
Even though there is no longer a separate business unit with coordinative 
responsibilities, industrial development as such is still very much on the agenda in Statoil. 
The motives for engaging in overseas industrial development are threefold: First, it is a 
question of positioning, gaining goodwill with regulatory authorities and eventually gaining 
access to production licences. Second, the activities related to industrial development are 
considered as useful to get to know the situation and the particular challenges in a new 
operating environment. In this respect, Statoil considers that industrial development has a risk 
mitigating function. Finally, developing local industry helps Statoil achieve its CSR goals, as 
well as to satisfy local governments‟ frequent requirements for a certain amount of local 
content (Hayes, interview, 2011). 
As for the TCAs, Statoil‟s aim is just as much to acquire as to share knowledge. That 
being said, the six individual TCAs span broadly; in some of them, Statoil has very little to 
learn while in others Statoil quite possibly learns more than it teaches (Hayes, interview, 
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2011). In either case, if one adheres to an understanding of technology limited to physical 
artefacts, it would be erroneous to say that the TCAs result in technology transfer, as they 
include neither sales nor transfers of machinery or blueprints, nor have they lead to patentable 
innovations. But according to the interviewee, the programmes were never supposed to lead 
to patentable innovations either, the purpose being limited to knowledge sharing and business 
development. Morten Fejerskov, who has worked with the Sonangol
7
-Statoil TCA, explained 
that, while specific technologies are not actually transferred, Sonangol is given access to 
expertise from Statoil and technologies are applied and demonstrated. Fejerskov believes that 
Statoil is more open in the knowledge sharing process than comparable companies 
(Fejerskov, interview, 2011). 
Hege Ebeltoft, who used to be the technology director of Statoil INT, pointed out that 
Statoil‟s strengths lie more in the understanding of proper applications of technology than in 
the development of technology as such: 
What Statoil excels at is to understand the problem, have a holistic view of 
things and go in and solve the problem. If you just buy some gadget, if you 
don‟t understand how to use it... You have to know what to buy. If you want a 
cup, you can buy it from Schlumberger, but we know whether you need a cup 
or a glass (Ebeltoft, interview, 2011). 
Schlumberger is – together with Weatherford International, Halliburton and Baker 
Hughes – one of the world‟s leading providers of oilfield services. Ebeltoft‟s cup-and-glass 
metaphor is meant to illustrate that oil companies usually purchase technology in the form of 
physical artefacts from such service companies, rather than developing it in-house. Zakariya 
observed this pattern already in 1982: “Although they control the initiation and exploitation of 
petroleum technology, and have a monopoly of the organizational and management 
techniques, the international oil companies practically never hold the technology concerned” 
(Zakariya, 1982: 209). If we invoke the definition of technology used by the United Nations 
                                                 
7
 Angolan NOC 
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Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), competences as the ones Ebeltoft 
describe may indeed be seen as integral to the company‟s total technological capacity:  
„Technology‟ includes not only knowledge or methods that are necessary to 
carry on or to improve the existing production and distribution of goods and 
services or indeed to develop entire new products or processes, but also 
entrepreneurial expertise and professional know-how. The latter two elements 
may often prove to be the essential competitive advantage possessed by the 
technology owner (UNCTAD, 2001: 6). 
In fact the cup-and-glass metaphor stands as an excellent description of how Statoil 
thinks about technology as a broad concept and how physical artefacts are only to a very 
limited extent involved in technology transfer programmes. In section 3.3., where I present 
specific examples of combined ITT and CSR projects in Statoil, it will become clear how the 
movement of physical technology is in fact almost irrelevant to projects which Statoil refers 
to as technology transfer. Instead, the programmes emphasise knowledge sharing and the 
strengthening of local economies‟ capacity to independently develop and manage relevant 
technology. 
4.2. The growth of CSR in the global petroleum industry and in Statoil 
Frynas notes how oil companies in general over the past decades have become more and more 
engaged in activities which at first glance might appear to have little or nothing to do with the 
discovery, extraction, refinement and sales of petroleum products:  
Oil companies now help to build schools and hospitals, launch micro-credit 
schemes for local people and assist youth employment programmes in 
developing countries. They participate in partnerships with established 
development agencies such as the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), while 
using NGOs to implement development projects on the ground (Frynas, 2005: 
581). 
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As we have seen, according to some definitions, it might also be referred to as CSR 
when oil companies promote environmental technologies and sustainable development, as for 
instance BP has tried to do since 2000 when it stopped using its full name “British Petroleum” 
and launched the slogan “Beyond Petroleum”. There is, however, a fine line in cases like 
these between CSR and marketing or even pure spin, as commentators have pointed out that 
BP‟s non-petroleum investment portfolio remains microscopic compared to its investments in 
hydrocarbons (Landman, 2010). 
Regardless of definitions, it is clear that oil companies – controlling vast financial 
resources and often doing business in weak or even failed states and in a challenging security 
environment – played a major role in putting CSR on the business agenda, simultaneously 
spurring increased interest in the topic among academics within the economic and 
management disciplines. In many ways, CSR arose as a tool for risk management, as MNCs 
like BP and Shell attempted to respond to pressure from external stakeholders. In BP‟s case, 
the formulation of a CSR strategy came about as a response to mounting criticism of the 
company‟s presence in China after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, as well as 
controversies in Colombia where security staff with close links to the country‟s paramilitary 
forces were hired to guard BP installations (Ryggvik, 2010: 253). As for Shell, the most 
important factors to trigger the new CSR policies were the controversies caused by Shell‟s 
alleged links to the hanging of human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in Nigeria in 1995 and 
by the company‟s plans to sink the storage and tanker loading buoy Brent Spar at sea the 
same year (Frynas, 2003). 
In 1990, Statoil entered what was called a “strategic alliance” with BP. Although 
Statoil had to a limited extent been involved in petroleum activities outside Norway since the 
late 1970s, the formation of the BP alliance was definitely the single most important step in 
what was to become a strategic realignment towards global operations (Larsen, interview, 
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2011). Together with BP, Statoil was involved in oil and gas activities in Azerbaijan, Angola, 
Vietnam and Nigeria, but it was only in Nigeria that Statoil was to take a leading role 
(Lerpold, 2003: 82-83). The former director of Statoil INT, Rolf Magne Larsen, recalls that 
operating in unfamiliar socio-cultural environments was a relatively new experience to Statoil 
and there were few, if any, formal procedures for social risk mitigation (Larsen, interview, 
2011). 
Statoil therefore began to formulate a CSR policy soon, but not immediately, after 
entering into the alliance with BP, and the already mentioned case in Nigeria in 1995 in many 
ways served as an eye-opener. Writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa – who had led a campaign 
against severe environmental degradation caused by oil companies in Ogoniland in the Niger 
Delta – was arrested and hanged by the regime of military dictator Sani Abacha. Saro-Wiwa‟s 
execution provoked outrage around the world, and pressure mounted for oil companies to 
condemn the execution. Statoil refused to do so, its information director claiming that “we 
have made it a policy in Statoil not to make statements on political conditions, governance 
and so on” and that “Statoil does not conduct foreign policy; that is up to Norwegian 
authorities” (Rønning, 1995). Larsen recalls that Statoil was unprepared for the extent to 
which the wider audience reacted negatively to such statements: “We came off as a company 
devoid of feelings. We had to professionalise our thinking about difficult issues we did not 
have experience to deal with. We had to understand the political, understand the culture, 
understand the local communities, risks and opportunities” (Larsen, interview, 2011). 
CSR in Statoil thus arose as a response to a difficult situation the company was 
unwittingly put in. Recalling McWilliams et al‟s (2006) distinction between strategic, 
altruistic and coerced CSR, it then seems reasonable to say that CSR in Statoil is – or at least 
was – primarily strategic CSR. Strategic CSR is closely linked to stakeholder management, a 
term frequently brought up by Statoil employees during interviews, indicating that the 
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primary motive for CSR today remains strategic more than altruistic. Alternatively, if we 
invoke the terminology proposed by Hockerts and Morsing, we can say that Statoil uses CSR 
to obtain legitimacy – a “licence to operate” – but also as an organizational tool for 
stakeholder management. 
The alliance with BP came to an end in 1999 after a merger between BP and Amoco 
the previous year. 2001 marked another watershed in Statoil‟s history when it was listed on 
stock exchanges in Oslo and New York and the Norwegian government sold around 20% of 
its shares. In 2007, the oil and gas division of Norsk Hydro, another large Norwegian energy 
company, was merged with Statoil, thus creating a company which is undisputedly the 
dominant actor on the Norwegian continental shelf. The Norwegian government today owns 
67% of Statoil.  
Notwithstanding its dominant position within Norway, Statoil is determined to 
continue the global expansion which started in the early 1990s, but it has by all accounts 
failed to establish a secure foothold among the leading international oil companies. Even 
though it has offices in some 40 countries around the world, Statoil has operatorship of only 
two producing fields, respectively in the Athabasca tar sands in Canada and on the Peregrino 
field off the coast of Brazil (Statoil, 2011d).
8
 Although it is fully possible for an oil company 
to make a profit as a relatively passive co-owner of a producing field, operatorship is 
considered essential in order to build a functioning industrial organisation, to take a leading 
role in negotiating the purchase of technology from the oil service companies, and also for 
positioning towards future licensing rounds. For these reasons, gaining operatorship is a 
strategic priority for Statoil in its international operations, as well as in Norway. 
CSR plays an important role in Statoil‟s ongoing international expansion. It is a line 
responsibility, meaning that each of Statoil‟s business units is in charge of independently 
                                                 
8
 Additionally, Statoil is the operator of exploration licences in Algeria, Canada (Newfoundland), the Faroe 
Islands, Mozambique, Great Britain, the United States (Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico) and in Venezuela. 
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planning and implementing CSR initiatives (Castellanos, interview, 2011). The CSR policy is 
built around three core commitments: Ensuring transparency and anti-corruption, respecting 
human rights and labour standards and generating spin-offs from the company‟s core 
activities to the benefit of local communities (Statoil, 2011b). Based on a risk assessment, and 
mainly a social risk assessment, conducted in the early stages of business development in a 
new country, Statoil will enact CSR programmes which it considers suitable to achieve the 
desired outcomes given the local particularities. In theory, all non-OECD country offices must 
prepare a CSR plan. As of 2010, however, CSR plans were only prepared for 80% of the non-
OECD countries with Statoil operations, as well as for Canada, the United States and Mexico. 
It is still worth noting that there has been a rapid increase in the percentage of countries which 
do prepare CSR plans; the similar numbers for 2007, 2008 and 2009 were, respectively, 33%, 
50% and 57% (Statoil, 2010b). 
I have indicated that Statoil‟s commitment to CSR can be said to be born out of 
strategic priorities, rather than of altruism. In this respect, it is worth mentioning how a few 
current and former CSR employees within Statoil regard their company‟s commitments. To 
Rolf Magne Larsen, the main reason for having a CSR policy is to “ensure that we have a 
correct and respectful behaviour and that we understand risks and opportunities” (Larsen, 
interview, 2011). Ilse Castellanos underlined how CSR contributes to a “strengthening of 
local capacity” (Castellanos, interview, 2011) and this, we shall see, is closely linked to how 
CSR intertwines with technology transfer. As for Hans-Aasmund Frisak, he described 
Statoil‟s CSR policy as a strategic asset and a competitive advantage, not to be understood as 
simple charity, nor as a tactical move to buy goodwill, but rather as a sincere attempt to create 
shared value together with relevant stakeholders (Frisak, interview, 2011). 
Frisak went on to cite the director of Statoil‟s operations in Canada who was asked by 
a journalist what he considered to be the biggest challenge related to the controversial oil sand 
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project in Alberta. One would easily expect to hear an answer about environmental damage 
from exceptionally high CO
2
 emissions and ensuing pressure from the international green 
lobby, but the director answered that the local population would be the biggest challenge, and 
that Statoil would not be able to achieve anything in Alberta if the local communities did not 
agree with their presence. Consequently, after an initial period of stakeholder dialogue and 
conducting risk assessments, Statoil has decided on which CSR measures it deems most 
relevant for the area, and among them figures a programme to offer vocational education to 
the local population that will enable them to gain employment at Statoil‟s sites. 
Part because of the risk of corruption and part because of a desire to quantify the 
seemingly unquantifiable, the CSR business sometimes appears characterised by an 
exceptional zeal towards reporting. CSR staff interviewed for this thesis stressed that extreme 
caution is taken to ensure compliance with different international standards. Since 2008, 
Statoil‟s annual report features an own section on sustainability. The sustainability report is 
separately audited by Ernst & Young and includes mentions of how the report rates according 
to the Global Reporting Initiative Index
9
 and according to the UN Global Compact Index
10
. 
Moreover, Statoil is committed to support implementation of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI)
11
 in countries in which it operates. Opinions among 
interviewees as to the usefulness of this reporting were mixed. Whereas Ilse Castellanos 
approved of the reporting and assured that the related paperwork does not take up an 
exceedingly large amount of CSR staffers‟ time, Hans-Aasmund Frisak stressed that 
physically getting the job done is more important than reporting it.  
                                                 
9
 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a Dutch NGO which produces a framework for sustainability 
reporting through dialogue with business, civil society, labour, academic and professional institutions. Statoil‟s 
sustainability reports from the years 2008-2010 have all been given the best attainable GRI score. 
10
 The UN Global Compact is a policy initiative, through which companies commit themselves to comply with 
10 principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. Statoil‟s sustainability 
reports fully satisfy the UN Global Compact‟s requirements for communication on progress. 
11
 The EITI is an NGO based in Norway which invites countries to adhere to a set of principles mainly 
concerning the public disclosure of payments from oil companies to governments. As of 2010, eight of the 
countries in which Statoil operates have implemented the EITI.  
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Determined efforts within reporting and quantification notwithstanding, the benefits 
that spring from CSR initiatives can to a certain extent be said to be of the rather intangible 
sort. Networking, cultural acclimatisation and knowledge build-up are all central. Since 
having good contacts with authorities and regulators is of significant importance in the 
petroleum industry, and since the lack of operatorship makes it more challenging to establish 
and maintain such contacts, CSR initiatives can in some cases serve as a valuable substitute to 
operatorship, since it gives the company an opportunity to engage authorities in dialogue over 
the aims of the project and its future outlook (Larsen, interview, 2011).  
4.3. Examples of combined ITT and CSR projects within Statoil 
4.3.1. The Angola-Norway Higher Education Initiative and the Management and 
Technology Transfer programme in Angola 
Angola is currently the country outside Norway where Statoil has the highest production, but 
Statoil has yet to gain operatorship in any Angolan licence. A civil war ravaged the country 
from the moment it gained independence from Portugal in 1975 and until the opposition 
leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in 2002. Most of the country‟s oil resources are located 
offshore in deep waters, and a combination of improved technology, rising oil prices and 
relative political stability since the end of the civil war has over the past decades made Angola 
one of the definite hot-spots of the global petroleum industry. A visitor to the capital, Luanda, 
cannot fail to notice the prevailing boom town atmosphere, as expats‟ and well-connected 
Angolans‟ SUVs clog the traffic while a small army of Chinese guest workers build new 
roads and glitzy skyscrapers. At the same time, poverty levels, though in rapid decline, remain 
at over 30% (UNDP, 2010), and spillovers from the petroleum industry to the rest of the 
economy – severely constrained by a lack of qualified human resources – are limited (AfDB 
et al., 2011: 144). 
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Part as positioning in the hope of gaining operatorship in the near future, and part as 
an effort to improve access to qualified labour, Statoil is engaged in several projects and 
programmes in Angola which aim in one way or another to strengthen education and local 
capacities and at least one of them – the Angola-Norway Higher Education Initiative 
(ANHEI) – has a clear CSR profile. Essentially, ANHEI aims to educate teachers to teach 
petroleum related subjects at the Agostinho Neto University (UAN) in Luanda. More 
specifically, the programme selects 5 students annually to follow a two-year master‟s 
programme where the first two semesters consist of courses in either petroleum geosciences 
or petroleum engineering at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in 
Trondheim and the last two semesters consist of courses and writing of a thesis at UAN.  
The programme is mainly a contract between NTNU and UAN; Statoil acts as 
facilitator and sponsor, but the bulk of the expenses are being covered by the Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). Statoil‟s main contribution has been to 
provide industry relevant guidance for students who are about to select a topic for their thesis, 
and also to help with training, supervision, office space, hardware and software for the 
students during the last two semesters. Statoil has also, with the help of its contacts from 
international universities and consultancies, set up short courses for the ANHEI students and 
other UAN students within topics like salt tectonics, seismic interpretation, satellite images 
and remote sensing. 
Following the introduction by Angolan authorities of a contractual obligation on oil 
companies to hire at least 70% of their staff locally, programmes like ANHEI are potentially a 
major direct benefit to the companies. After decades of civil war preceded by colonial rule, 
Angola‟s education system is in a poor state, and the oil companies struggle to find 
sufficiently qualified personnel within the country. At least in theory, ANHEI would remedy 
such recruitment problems, and is regarded by Statoil as a better solution than simply 
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providing scholarships to the best students. In the long run, Statoil hopes that the programme 
will improve both the quality and the quantity of Angolan university graduates and also that it 
will lead to the establishment of an Angolan Master‟s programme in petroleum geosciences 
and engineering.  
However, the first four years of the programme has brought up some challenges, most 
notably with regards to student selection. Information about the programme was scarce and 
applications correspondingly few. This resulted in UAN selecting students that were not 
sufficiently motivated or had poor English skills. The result was that the students had 
problems to follow the courses that were taught and did not manage to complete their 
education. To mitigate this problem Statoil contacted UAN and offered to assist in the 
selection process. Information meetings for students were set up, where former students and 
Statoil representatives informed about the program. Interviews were conducted where also 
Statoil representatives participated and preparatory courses in English and basic skills were 
set up for the students that were selected. According to Morten Fejerskov, the changes to the 
recruitment process have been fruitful, and the contingent scheduled to graduate in the 
summer of 2011 appears promising (Fejerskov, interview, 2011). 
Another problem with ANHEI has been to get UAN to engage the students after they 
graduate. The objective is that most or all of them should return to UAN to teach, but red tape 
and insufficient funding tends to put obstacles in the way. The Angolan university system is 
old and bureaucratic, and UAN was not sufficiently prepared to hire students. According to 
Fejerskov, it sometimes takes years to create a new teaching position and the wages are not 
competitive. In addition, the university is generally ill equipped, both financially and 
materially (Fejerskov, interview, 2011). 
Like ANHEI, the now defunct Management and Technology Transfer Programme 
(MTT), was also aimed at strengthening petroleum-related competences in Angola. However, 
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while ANHEI primarily targets the university sector, there was an explicit business 
motivation behind MTT, which was an initiative between Statoil and Sonangol aimed at 
recruiting and educating engineers and geoscientists for joint operations on Block 34, where 
Sonangol is the operator and Statoil has a 50% ownership share, its largest in any Angolan 
licence. In contrast to ANHEI, MTT has not been regarded as or promoted as a CSR project. 
The objective was to build up a qualified local workforce able to conduct operations on Block 
34. 
MTT ran for 6 years and provided a total of 40 Angolans with higher education 
ranging from bachelor‟s degrees to PhDs. The students were first given two years of training 
in English, the last of which took place in the United Kingdom, and were then sent to 
Aberdeen to take the relevant degree there. However, as exploration drilling on Block 34 
proved disappointing, the MTT graduates were instead employed by Sonangol on other 
projects. Morten Fejerskov still considers the programme very successful and said that the 
MTT graduates are now holding important technical and managerial positions in Sonangol 
(Fejerskov, interview, 2011). Since the oil business is by nature heavily politicized and an oil 
company‟s access to exploration licences to a large extent relies on networking and good 
contacts with decision makers, Statoil can understandably hope to gain advantages in the 
future from having contributed to the education of core employees in the Angolan national oil 
company. A likely factor to explain MTT‟s success is the way the recruitment was conducted 
from the very first stages. In a country where corruption and nepotism permeates the political 
and professional culture
12
, Statoil was able to insist that personal qualities, not family 
contacts, would be decisive for recruitment and that an external company would be hired to 
conduct testing and interviews with each candidate. 
                                                 
12
 Angola is ranked 168
th
 of 178 countries on Transparency International‟s Corruption Perceptions Index of 
2010, available at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (accessed 
29.06.2011) 
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As mentioned, Statoil has not yet gained operatorship in any Angolan licence. But 
regulatory authorities have now expressed that Statoil is a “preferred operator” on a number 
of blocks about to be opened up for exploration (Larsen, interview, 2011; Fejerskov, 
interview, 2011). Even though licence awards are now almost exclusively based on how 
financially competitive the bid is, and bids are made publicly available, several of the Statoil 
employees I‟ve interviewed believe that Statoil‟s CSR-driven initiatives for education and 
capacity building in Angola may have contributed positively. Fejerskov also speculates that a 
programme similar to MTT might be resuscitated if Statoil were to gain operatorship of an 
Angolan license (Fejerskov, interview, 2011). 
4.3.2. Skills-development and technology transfer programme in Venezuela 
Venezuela is an important country for Statoil, as testified by the frequent references it makes 
on its webpage to the “long-term perspective on its presence”. Currently, though, Statoil‟s 
participation in Venezuelan licences is limited to a 9.67% share in the Petrocedeño extra-
heavy crude oil project and the operatorship and 51% share of an exploration licence in the 
offshore Plataforma Deltana area, where development is stalled pending delimitations of 
borders between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago (Statoil, 2007). 5 of the first 8 returns 
on a Google search for “Statoil Venezuela” have visibly negative headlines, respectively 
“Statoil fell short in Venezuela”, “Statoil‟s failed strategy in Venezuela”, “Statoil‟s 
Venezuelan adventure comes to an end”, “Statoil‟s plan in Venezuela failed” and “Statoil 
failed in Venezuela”.13 
Statoil has indeed experienced some problematic years in Venezuela. In 2007, it was 
forced to reduce its ownership share in Petrocedeño from 15% to the present 9.67% following 
the decision by president Chávez that the Venezuelan NOC PDVSA should have an 
ownership share of at least 60% in all licences. Then, in early 2011, Wikileaks cables revealed 
                                                 
13
 Search conducted 30 June 2011 on Norwegian Google (my translations). 
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that the president of Statoil Venezuela had expressed strong displeasure over the decision by 
oil companies Chevron and Repsol to bid for a licence in Venezuela despite an alleged 
agreement between international oil companies to boycott the bidding round in an attempt to 
force Venezuelan authorities to offer better terms (Dommersnes, 2011). The revelations 
prompted a negative media cycle with less than subtle accusations of bullying behaviour by 
Statoil. 
Challenges on the operational front notwithstanding, Statoil has contributed to a skills-
development and technology transfer programme in Venezuela since 2005. In many ways, the 
project resembles the MTT and ANHEI programmes in Angola, in that it brings together a 
local and a foreign university – the Universidad Simón Bolívar (USB) and NTNU, 
respectively – and in that it aims to strengthen local capacities and provide a future 
recruitment base for Statoil. Similarly, sales or transfers of specific technologies do not occur 
within the programme; rather, it has involved training of university professors, conducting a 
series of workshops for practicing engineers from the national oil company and governmental 
agencies, as well as more motivational work inspiring young university lecturers. Finally, a 
large group of engineers have become specialists through the project. Professor Michael 
Golan has been the project manager from the NTNU side and says that what is actually being 
transferred is a mixture of scientific knowledge, industrial practices and experiences, modern 
engineering working processes, technology teaching skills and teaching material (Golan, 
correspondence, 2011). As of March 2011, 30 students have graduated from USB with 
Master‟s degrees in petroleum-related subjects, assisted by Statoil and NTNU in finding 
topics for their master thesis. 
Skills development as described above is a way for Statoil to gain, or rather retain, a 
foothold within Venezuela, which must be said to be a country of vital strategic importance 
for any actor wishing to play a role in the global oil industry over the next decades. Although 
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estimates vary, Venezuela is definitely among the top five to ten countries in the world 
measured by remaining oil reserves.
14
 Since a lot of this oil is found onshore, Venezuela is 
also a country where Statoil could have a lot to learn in terms of technology. Politically 
speaking, however, the Venezuela run by socialist president Hugo Chávez has proven to be a 
hard nut to crack by Statoil which, as we have seen, failed in its strategy to force through 
better terms in a round of bidding for new licences. This stands as a visible sign that the 
Venezuelan state is confident enough to retain the upper hand in negotiations with the global 
oil industry.  
One possible way for Statoil to gain necessary goodwill in a country determined to use 
its political machinery as leverage to ensure the maximum rate of return on petroleum 
resources to the state, would be to play on its role as a state-owned oil company itself and 
enlist the help of the Norwegian diplomatic service in remaining on friendly terms with 
official Venezuela. Recalling the way Statoil was set up precisely as a tool to hinder foreign 
oil companies from extracting oil revenues which could potentially flow to the Norwegian 
state, such an approach seems sensible at first sight. Both of these strategies are out of reach, 
however, given that one third of Statoil is privatised and traded on stock markets in Oslo and 
New York and also knowing that Norway‟s bilateral relations with Venezuela are 
substantially less intimate than with other major oil producing countries.
15
 After the negative 
publicity mentioned above, one can only assume that Statoil hopes to use technology transfer 
and knowledge sharing as a way of bypassing strained political relations and accumulate the 
goodwill which is vital for any hope of gaining operatorship of licences in the future. 
                                                 
14
 The United States Energy Information Administration lists three different sources for information on global 
remaining oil reserves on www.eia.gov/emeu/international/oilreserves.html. Two of the sources place 
Venezuela‟s remaining reserves as the 6th largest in the world and the third source puts Venezuela 5th.  
15
 In the last five years, Venezuela has received one visit by a Norwegian member of government, namely the 
Minister of the Environment and International Development. In the same period, ministers and state secretaries 
of several ministries have paid regular visits to both Angola and Azerbaijan. As for Russia, Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov famously claimed in 2006 that he has more frequent contact with his Norwegian colleague Jonas 
Gahr Støre than with his own wife. 
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4.3.3. Supplier development and strengthening of education in Northwest 
Russia 
In Russia, Statoil owns 24% of Shtokman Development AG (SDAG), which is the operator of 
the giant gas field Shtokman in the Barents Sea, currently scheduled to commence production 
in 2016 (SDAG, 2011). The field itself is located several hundred kilometres offshore, and the 
logistical support facilities are to be concentrated in Northwest Russia in and around the cities 
of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. This is also the area where the bulk of Statoil‟s CSR 
programmes are located. 
Statoil‟s CSR efforts in Northwest Russia are concentrated on three aspects: 
Environment, supplier development and education, of which supplier development and 
education are the most relevant for this thesis. Part because of geographical conditions and 
part because of political requirements for local content, development of the Shtokman field is 
contingent on a reliable base of local suppliers. But since the industries in Northwest Russia 
have little experience in supplying petroleum companies, it is in Statoil‟s own interest to 
contribute to advances in this field, as noted in its sustainability report of 2008:  
Investing in a competent, local supply network will lower costs and reduce 
project risks in addition to ensuring greater local participation in project 
benefits.  
We are working to develop the local supply industry and private sector in 
north-western Russia, drawing on our experiences from the Snøhvit and Ormen 
Lange developments in Norway (Statoil, 2008c). 
In addition to the general, and somewhat vague, notion of “capacity and skills-
building”, the suppliers development programme in practice consists of mapping, 
identification and pre-qualification of potential Russian suppliers, and also assisting local 
suppliers in organising themselves in industry associations (Statoil, 2008c). Within education, 
Statoil works with universities in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk to strengthen their curricula in 
petroleum related sciences, as exemplified by the establishment of a Bachelor of Business 
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Administration at the Pomor State University, focusing on petroleum management, developed 
in cooperation with NTNU and partially funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Statoil has also helped set up a technology transfer programme between the 
University of Stavanger and the Arkhangelsk State Technical University (Statoil, 2008b). 
According to Benedikt Henriksen, Russia has solid competences in onshore petroleum 
technology, but lags behind when it comes to offshore technology. As a contribution to filling 
this knowledge gap, Statoil helped put up 8 new subjects at local universities. 
Although one might expect that local authorities would warmly and uncritically 
embrace any CSR initiatives as a free opportunity for growth in the region, it was far from 
evident that Statoil‟s projects would go down well with regulators and stakeholders in Russia, 
according to Benedikt Henriksen. Business and politics is closely intertwined in Russia, and it 
would not have been possible to start any project without official sanction. Prior to project 
initiation, Statoil therefore entered a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with authorities 
in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk areas where the broad outline of the proposed CSR efforts 
was described. Contacts also had to be established with politicians linked to the federal 
government, including the Duma. For the CSR programmes to be effective, it was of vital 
importance that they not be seen as simple “greenwashing” or strategic positioning. That is 
why Benedikt Henriksen is still careful to underline that  
our CSR strategy and our CSR policy as formulated on the corporate level is 
the reason why we do this. Through CSR projects you want to give something 
back to the society you‟re a part of. We are an important part of society, 
especially at the regional level, because projects like ours potentially employ 
thousands of people (Henriksen, interview, 2011). 
As to the effectiveness of the CSR programmes in promoting Statoil‟s business case, it 
is again difficult to affirm exactly which factors were decisive in the decision of Russian 
authorities to invite Statoil to take part in the development of Shtokman. But the decision was 
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made well after the programmes were initiated, and it could therefore be claimed that they 
played a role in conveying a sympathetic image of Statoil. Based on experience from teaching 
a course on petroleum and society in Arkhangelsk in the framework of the Statoil-funded 
programme, Ryggvik has opined that, compared to oil countries in the global south, Russia is 
a place where Statoil is less likely to succeed in communicating itself as essentially the 
extended arm of a benevolent state eager to share its positive experience with the 
development of a petroleum sector. In Russia, he writes, Norway is first and foremost a 
NATO member and Statoil first and foremost a company seeking to exploit a share of 
Russia‟s natural resources (Ryggvik, 2010: 363). In this line of thinking, the education 
programmes are even more important as “proof” to Russian authorities of Statoil‟s good 
intentions in the region. 
As in Angola and Venezuela, the Russian projects do not involve transfer of any 
specific technology. Indeed, Henriksen seemed to give more weight to the term exchange of 
experience, rather than technology transfer: “We tell our Russian friends in a humble way 
what experiences we‟ve had” (Henriksen, interview, 2011). Thus underlining the need for 
humility, Henriksen pointed out that Statoil, along with the rest of the Norwegian petroleum 
sector, has built up excellent competences within offshore petroleum operations. That is 
useful experience to share with other countries, in particular countries like Angola and Brasil, 
where a lot of the oil is found offshore, but also Russia, where hopes are high for future 
development of the Shtokman field.  
Located several hundred kilometres offshore and on deep water, Shtokman will in fact 
be so technologically demanding to develop that participation in the project can be said to be 
strategically important for Statoil in that it offers unique learning opportunities which can 
possibly be used to Statoil‟s advantage in later licensing rounds in Russia. If Statoil can 
establish a reputation as a qualified actor with experience from challenging developments 
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within Russia – or even as a benevolent guarantor of increased petroleum-related know-how 
among Russian students and scientists – it is not unreasonable to expect regulatory authorities 
to take a favourable view of the company. But as for Shtokman there are major uncertainties 
about the profitability of the field, given the huge investments required and the volatility of 
gas prices, and the final investment decision has yet to be made. Russia‟s prime minister, 
Vladimir Putin, recently expressed impatience at the progress towards commercial 
exploitation on Shtokman and urged the project partners to endeavour to start production by 
the end of 2016 (Bjørsvik, 2011, RIAN, 2011). 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of empirical findings 
5.1. Characteristics of combined ITT and CSR projects 
I am attempting with this thesis to direct attention towards the interaction between two 
business functions and their corresponding academic fields. Even though both fields have 
been studied extensively, there is a clear deficiency of academic works on how CSR affects 
ITT and how ITT affects CSR. Moreover, it became evident during interviews with Statoil 
employees that these questions have yet to be reflected upon within the company as well. An 
easy conclusion would therefore be to say that CSR and ITT are unrelated and should be 
treated as the separate tools in the corporate manager‟s toolbox that they are. I am, however, 
convinced of the impossibility of saying that CSR and ITT do not relate. My conviction is 
based first on thematic similarities between the two academic fields, and second on 
observations on how the two business functions overlap within Statoil. 
If we regard the rhetoric of scientific articles from the respective academic fields, they 
often respond quite directly to challenges highlighted by the other field or, in some cases, they 
are concerned about the same possible obstacles to success. For example, when Bozeman 
proposes economic development – that a country or region should be better off in the wake of 
technology transfer – and human resources – that the skills of an economy‟s labourers should 
be improved – as criteria for measuring the effectiveness of technology transfer, he quite 
explicitly points out how technology transfer can be seen as a CSR measure in line with 
McWilliams and Siegel‟s requirement that CSR should “further some social good, beyond the 
interests of the firm and that which is required by law”.16 And when Frynas warns about the 
temptation to devote too little time to build personal relations between oil companies‟ CSR 
staff and the inhabitants of villages targeted for CSR initiatives (2005: 591-592), it is similar 
                                                 
16
 As we have noted, there is no reason to believe that the requirement to cause positive effects beyond the 
interests of the firm necessarily equates non-compliance with these very interests. 
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to Reddy and Zhao‟s concern that “the geographic transfer of technology may be of little use 
unless the appropriate human resources are simultaneously made available” (1990: 292). 
As well as signs of the two academic fields pointing in the same direction, there are 
also clear empirical examples within Statoil of ITT projects with a visible CSR component 
and vice versa. To name but one of them, ANHEI can be classified as a CSR project in that it 
“demonstrate[s] the inclusion of social (...) concerns in business operations and in interactions 
with stakeholders” (Marrewijk, 2003: 102), all while simultaneously satisfying the definition 
of ITT as a process in which “science and technology are transferred from one individual or 
group to another that incorporates this new technology into a new or improved process, 
product, system or way of doing something” (Singh, 2003: 2). The same compatibility can 
also be said to apply to projects in Russia and Venezuela. 
What, then, do Statoil employees themselves identify as distinct characteristics of 
projects in which CSR and ITT intertwine, as compared to “pure ITT” or “pure CSR”? 
Morten Fejerskov found that when ITT projects are linked to CSR, project execution and 
management is strengthened. CSR is a business tool which is often used in projects where 
there is a substantial risk of corruption. Hence Statoil‟s CSR team has developed stringent 
routines for due diligence, follow-up and reporting, which Fejerskov found to be of benefit to 
the ITT projects. We have seen other examples of how the CSR sphere is preoccupied with a 
high degree of reporting and adherence to formal criteria as proposed both internally and by 
external agents such as the UN Global Compact.  
CSR, even though in the long run it is meant to provide returns to a company, is in the 
first instance about spending a company‟s resources for the benefit of external actors, be it 
persons, NGOs or countries. It comes as no surprise, then, that company managers and 
shareholders will be all the more weary that the resources spent produce tangible results. It 
also comes as no surprise that oil companies, often subject to criticism for damaging the 
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environment and turning a blind eye to harmful societal implications of the petroleum 
economy, have a strong interest in being able to demonstrate how they are taking action “for 
the greater good”. Compared to pure ITT projects, one should then expect that the planning 
and reporting of combined ITT and CSR projects is more structured and more observant of 
specified criteria. 
From a somewhat different perspective, Simon Hayes pointed out how it is often more 
difficult to see “the business case” in ITT projects with a CSR component, in the sense that 
the objective of creating benefits for the receiving party can overshadow the objective of 
generating profits for the company itself. According to Professor Michael Golan of NTNU, 
the most noticeable characteristic of these kinds of projects is indeed the fact that the good of 
the receiving party is the main driver behind the planning and execution of the programme. 
He says that NTNU worked completely freely with planning and execution of the programme 
in Venezuela, and that there were no attempts from Statoil‟s side to interfere (Golan, 
correspondence, 2011). In Northwest Russia, of the more than 50 students who have benefited 
from stipends financed by Statoil, only 2 have started working for the company. The low 
recruitment rate is the result of a conscious decision by Statoil to encourage the students to 
take up jobs in local companies, ostensibly because Statoil is wary about brain-draining the 
local economy. One should not forget, however, that the final investment decision for the 
Shtokman project has yet to be made, and that, accordingly, there are still few prospects for 
long-term secure employment with Statoil in the region. 
Because CSR projects usually offer low potential for short-term financial profits, it is 
possible to imagine that staff working with ITT can become hesitant towards the inclusion of 
a CSR component in their projects, especially if the company‟s performance criteria assign a 
higher importance to profit generation than to the success of CSR projects. But the “business 
case” mentioned by Hayes can still be admitted to combined CSR and ITT projects, if one 
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analyzes CSR on the institutional level as proposed by Hockerts and Morsing, whereby CSR 
is an instrument companies enact to obtain the necessary goodwill of the surrounding 
environment or a “license to operate”. Performance on this level will, however, always be 
very hard to quantify. Moreover, in addition to a potential reluctance among ITT staff towards 
using their projects to fulfil CSR goals, Statoil‟s CSR division has remained absent from 
several technology transfer or knowledge sharing initiatives which could clearly be said to 
serve CSR-related purposes. IID, for example, worked independent of interference from the 
CSR division throughout its existence. 
From a CSR perspective, Ilse Castellanos noted how technology transfer allows for a 
wider impact than other CSR projects:  
When you work with technology you are contributing to a nation, to a country, 
that can apply that technology in many locations. Even if you do it with one 
university, universities have national scope. If you work with one specific field 
of the local industry, let‟s imagine that we are working on a project with sub-
surface, if you share that technology it can be applied to any part of the country 
(Castellanos, interview, 2011). 
Frynas, in his critical article on CSR in the petroleum industry, warned that, because 
of oil companies‟ determined networking with bureaucrats and politicians in powerful 
positions, “the development priorities pursued by oil companies may be those of specific 
government officials and not necessarily those of the people for whose benefit the initiatives 
are ostensibly undertaken” (2005: 584). Along the same lines, Zakariya was critical of the 
petroleum business‟ ability to transfer technology in a genuinely beneficial way: 
Petroleum exploration and development contracts with the transnational 
companies are not, by and large, the most effective instrument for transfer of 
technology to host countries, not only because the transfer of technology is not 
the primary goal of such contracts, but also due to the basic divergence of 
interest of the two parties on this issue (Zakariya, 1982: 221). 
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These risks are undoubtedly real; it seems evident that when Statoil initiates 
technology transfer, it expects, or at least believes, that it will gain goodwill that can later be 
converted to a favourable position in licensing rounds. But if Castellanos‟ assumptions about 
ITT‟s ability to disperse positive effects across a wider spectrum of the economy are correct, 
ITT can at least be said to mitigate the risk that CSR initiatives benefit a too narrow group. I 
have also learnt about an adverse example, where Statoil‟s CSR division had to persuade a 
project team to let a technology transfer project go through, even though the project team saw 
the potential benefits to Statoil as very limited.
17
 These two examples illustrate how the 
coupling of two business functions can attenuate risks and disperse benefits more broadly. 
5.1.1. Effectiveness criteria 
Having mentioned Bozeman‟s suggestions for criteria to measure technology transfer 
effectiveness, it appeared useful to find out which, if any, criteria Statoil uses for the same 
purpose, and if there are indications that criteria vary depending on whether projects are seen 
from a CSR or an ITT vantage point. Of the six proposed criteria, “Economic Development” 
and “Human Capital” seem most relevant for CSR purposes, whereas Bozeman himself 
remarks that “despite analytical and evaluation difficulties, Market Impact and Economic 
Development criteria are in most instances the acid test of technology transfer” (Bozeman, 
2000: 647). 
 While Statoil a priori has no standardised criteria for measuring effectiveness of 
projects, the project planning phase usually involves the definition of key performance 
indicators (KPI), and project evaluation is to a large extent concentrated on determining 
whether or not KPIs have been attained. On a general note, Ilse Castellanos remarked that “a 
successful social investment project is one that matches the needs of the affected stakeholders 
and is according to our standards and our values.” She also said that good technology transfer 
                                                 
17
 My source for this information wishes to remain anonymous. 
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is “to have the technology up and running, run by a local institution” (Castellanos, interview, 
2011). Even though this comes very close to the adoption of Bozeman‟s “Out-the-Door” 
criterion, Castellanos‟ insistence that the technology should be run by a local institution 
indicates that Statoil is also concerned with the “Scientific and Technical Human Capital” 
criterion. Hans-Aasmund Frisak, who also has a CSR-related background, did not mention 
any specific evaluation criteria, but said that Statoil regards CSR as a competitive advantage, 
that charity and pure goodwill lie outside the domain of CSR, and that Statoil wishes to make 
use of CSR to obtain operating licences. It can thus be assumed that CSR projects will be 
evaluated, implicitly or explicitly, according to the “Political Reward” criterion. Rolf Magne 
Larsen and Morten Fejerskov speculated that technology cooperation could have had a 
favourable effect on Sonangol‟s decision to name Statoil the “preferred operator” on three 
new fields in Angola, in which case the cooperation would be deemed effective according to 
the “Political Reward” criterion. 
In fact, cooperative projects in which all parties contribute to mutual learning were 
often emphasised by interviewees as ideal projects. As Hege Ebeltoft explained, “the best 
cooperation is when you manage to establish projects where both parties learn and develop 
something together.” When he was involved with the Statoil-Sonangol technology 
cooperation, Morten Fejerskov experienced demands from senior management to demonstrate 
tangible results. The demands were met in quantitative terms by counting the number of field 
trips and seminars conducted, students involved and papers presented; and in qualitative terms 
by highlighting the outcomes of a project to improve geological understanding through salt 
tectonic modelling and the personal networks that were created and maintained as a result of 
the cooperation. Through the cooperation, Statoil was also able to access data otherwise not 
available. In return, Statoil contributed expertise in 3D visualisation and data interpretation. 
One of the main achievements of the cooperation was the discovery of an area with 
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potentially sensitive geological information which could give the two companies a 
competitive advantage. It is thus possible to deem this project effective according to the 
“Market Impact” criterion, but also to some extent according to the “Human Capital” 
criterion, in that Angolan scientists and Sonangol employees learnt about modelling and data 
interpretation.  
Neither Benedikt Henriksen nor Simon Hayes mentioned any specific evaluation 
criteria, but instead explained quality compliance in more vague terms such as “we follow our 
gut feeling” or “we talk to people and get an impression that things are going well”.18 When 
asked to elaborate, Henriksen‟s view on evaluation appeared to a large extent to be 
compatible with Bozeman‟s “Human Capital” criterion. From the beginning, the educational 
outcome of the projects in Northwest Russia was impeded by the fact that students didn‟t 
speak proper English. After Statoil insisted on interviewing each candidate for the stipend, 
they were able to assure that the candidate had the necessary language skills, and education 
outcomes improved. The projects in Venezuela have many similarities with the ones in 
Northwest Russia, and Professor Golan also said that “Human Capital” is the most fitting of 
Bozeman‟s criteria. 
To summarise, the interviewees‟ views on which factors make a CSR or ITT project 
successful indicate that Bozeman‟s “Human Capital” criterion is very relevant. But we can 
also see other effects of combined CSR and ITT projects, such as the potential market impact 
and political reward which came out of the Statoil-Sonangol technology cooperation. Most 
importantly, though, since few of the interviewees had their minds made up about specific 
criteria apart from fulfilment of KPI requirements, there is reason to believe that in practice, 
Bozeman‟s “Out-the-Door” criterion is the most commonly used: A CSR or ITT project will 
have a tendency to be deemed effective by the very fact that it has occurred.  
                                                 
18
 Hayes later stressed that this is applicable to general quality criteria and not to financial and governance 
criteria, which are rigorously adhered to. 
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5.1.2. Is CSR always voluntary? 
We have seen how several definitions and explanations of CSR include a notion of something 
being “voluntary”, in the sense that it stretches beyond compliance with laws and regulations 
(e.g. Marrewijk, 2003, McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). But Statoil‟s concept of CSR also 
includes projects to which it is contractually committed. In its annual sustainability report, 
Statoil publishes financial indicators on how much it has spent on “social investments” in 
different regions. As is made clear in the report, most of the projects mentioned in this thesis 
are defined as social investments:  
Social investments are used to build local content and capacity, as well as to 
promote transparent operating environments and respect for human rights so 
that affected communities can share in the benefits generated by our 
operations. (...) Our social investment projects involve training and capacity 
building, including technical training relating to the oil industry, which is seen 
as a way of build (sic.) competence among local suppliers (Statoil, 2010a). 
Hans-Aasmund Frisak explained that when Statoil enters a new country, it often faces 
requirements by the country‟s authorities for a certain amount of local content. Local content 
typically means hiring a certain percentage of staff locally and using local suppliers and sub-
contractors whenever possible. However, when oil and gas are found in poor countries with 
dysfunctional education systems, insufficient infrastructure and few competent suppliers, 
hiring and procuring locally can be a major challenge. Vocational training and the training of 
specialised engineers then presents itself as a win-win situation, where the oil company can 
contribute both financially and with know-how to increase local knowledge, at the same time 
meeting its obligations on local content. Frisak brought up the example of Canada, where 
indigenous peoples are given the opportunity to get vocational training that qualifies them for 
jobs on Statoil‟s sites afterwards. We have already mentioned relevant programmes in 
Angola, Russia and Venezuela, and similar projects are also found in Nigeria – where Statoil 
sponsors a project entitled Enhancing Fabrication Capabilities in the Nigerian Oil & Gas 
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Industry, which aims to strengthen Nigerian small and medium-sized enterprises‟ chances of 
winning contracts with international oil companies – and in Algeria – where the Statoil-
sponsored Institut Algérien du Pétrole educates workers for the growing Algerian energy 
sector (Statoil, 2008a). 
Of the NOK 202 million Statoil spent on social investments in 2010, NOK 172 million 
was voluntary and only NOK 30 million was contractual spending. Relatively speaking, 
though, contractual projects are remarkably more frequent in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
NOK 20 million out of a total NOK 33 million spent were contractual contributions. Frisak 
speculated that this can be because of these countries‟ experience with foreign – including 
Norwegian – development aid (Frisak, interview, 2011). In this line of thinking, African 
regulators would be more skilled than their peers in, for example, the former Soviet Union at 
knowing which requirements one can expect to impose on foreign firms operating in the 
country without the firms pulling out. While it is not immediately clear that experience in 
receiving development aid should lead to better regulation of business activities, Statoil‟s 
CSR activities in Sub-Saharan Africa do illustrate that, regardless of several definitions 
stressing the need to move beyond compliance with legislation, projects which are born as a 
result of legal regulations may also be defined by firms as CSR. 
5.2. How history influences ITT and CSR in Statoil 
I find strong evidence that Statoil employees are conscious about their company‟s history – 
and, in a wider perspective, the history of the Norwegian petroleum sector. In most cases, 
they also have an opinion on real or perceived influences of Statoil‟s history on its present 
day-to-day business. After Norway was able to benefit from international know-how and 
build up a capacity to independently conduct exploration and development of petroleum 
resources on the Norwegian continental shelf, one could expect two possible paths for 
Norwegian petroleum companies‟ entry on the international scene: In one case, companies 
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could be wary of diluting their expertise by sharing it with competitors and attempt to retain a 
maximum amount of knowledge within company bounds. In the opposite case, companies 
could adopt an open approach by using their expertise as a competitive advantage and market 
willingness to share information as a potential leverage to gain access to new countries. 
What I believe to have found is that Statoil has to a large extent taken the second 
approach. I will not be pretentious about the revolutionary originality of this finding. The 
Norwegian government encourages all Norwegian businesses to comply with the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which stipulate that “enterprises should contribute 
to the transfer of technology and know-how to host countries and to the development of local 
and national innovative capacity” (MFA, 2009: 29). Given the Norwegian government‟s high 
ownership interest in Statoil, it would indeed be problematic if Statoil was perceived as 
protective of its know-how when conducting operations abroad. It is nevertheless worth 
noting that all the Statoil employees who I interviewed for this thesis expressed enthusiasm 
for the ability to combine profit making business operations with the dissemination of 
knowledge in other countries. 
As an example, Benedikt Henriksen said that Statoil aims to bring the Norwegian 
model to Russia. What he defines as the Norwegian model is the idea that Statoil‟s activities 
should cause positive effects beyond pure generation of profits for the company. Henriksen 
pointed to the recent history of the Norwegian coast which, he says, wouldn‟t be what it is 
today if it weren‟t for oil and gas. In Northwest Russia, Statoil has helped develop the 
supplier industry, higher education institutions have realigned their profiles and there have 
been projects aiming at preserving the environment at sea and on shore. Henriksen also 
brought up the successful “Norwegian triangle” of suppliers, oil companies and higher 
education institutions collaborating for the advance of technological development. In Russia, 
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according to Henriksen, the three elements have been working more separately without 
bridging. Still, Henriksen was humble about how much Norway can expect to contribute: 
We must be aware that we have a relatively short petroleum history. In Norway 
it has been going on for 30-40 years, whereas in Russia it has been going on for 
125 years. But 98% of what happens in Russia happens onshore. We have to be 
humble and understand that we‟re not coming into a country which doesn‟t 
have a clue about oil and gas; it‟s simply a matter of a different structure 
(Henriksen, interview, 2011). 
Ilse Castellanos, who is Venezuelan and can therefore to a certain extent be said to 
provide an outsider‟s view on the Norwegian petroleum sector, also highlighted the 
cooperative Norwegian model as an example to bring out to the world:  
The beauty of technology transfer is the model that Norway has developed, as 
far as I understand. The industry works with universities to develop and give 
solutions to technical problems, and that is the perfect partnership. Because the 
industries can be focused on developing the core business, and then you have 
academia helping the industry to give responses to the technical challenges. 
That‟s the perfect combination! (Castellanos, interview, 2011) 
Still, it should be noted that fruitful university-industry cooperation, far from unique to 
Norway, is observed in an array of countries, particularly in the Western world. What is often 
regarded as a specifically successful “Norwegian” triangle, on the other hand, is the 
cooperation between government, industry associations and labour associations which inter 
alia is intended to ensure a coordinated and moderate wage growth. To the extent that Statoil 
adheres to the UN Global Compact‟s principle on freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining, it can be said that it aims to export this 
Norwegian tripartite model. 
On the question on whether Statoil‟s history gives it specific competitive advantages, 
Castellanos was hesitant. In bidding rounds for licences, the central question is at the end of 
the day which company can offer maximum returns at the lowest possible cost. Benedikt 
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Henriksen similarly remarked that “the competition is fierce, and you never get an answer to 
exactly why you‟re awarded licences. But we believe that we‟ve been working the right way” 
(Henriksen, interview, 2011). 
In Angola, Statoil has a technical support agreement with Sonangol on the Gimboa 
field in Block 4/05, where the intention is that Statoil will help Sonangol acquire the 
necessary competences to independently operate its first deep-water field. At the most, 20 
Statoil employees worked for this project, but today only 4 remain, and their functions are all 
meant to be taken over by Sonangol staff in the near future. The Gimboa example is 
interesting in that it resembles the arrangements on the Gullfaks and Statfjord fields during 
the early years of the Norwegian petroleum industry, only with Statoil now acting more as a 
teacher than as a pupil. 
According to Morten Fejerskov, Statoil was asked by Sonangol to assist in developing 
the Gimboa field after the disappointing exploration drilling on Block 34 which led to the 
discontinuation of the MTT programme. Because of its good relationship with Sonangol, and 
in order to demonstrate long-term commitment in Angola, Statoil accepted the request, 
presumably hoping for future cooperation on other blocks as well. Fejerskov said that there 
were discussions internally in Statoil on how much knowledge would be shared, and that 
some technology was retained, whereas management systems were to a large extent shared. 
Overall, Fejerskov found that Statoil is “more open than other companies when it 
comes to sharing”, which he primarily attributed to Statoil‟s recent history as a technology 
recipient. However, Fejerskov also underlined that Statoil does not as of now consider 
Sonangol as a competitor or threatening rival, but more as an ally. This, he said, may change 
in the future if Sonangol becomes a larger international oil company. In fact, the tension 
which Fejerskov thus touches upon can be seen as a red line through the early years of the 
Norwegian petroleum industry as well. As Engen remarks, “the international oil industry 
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represented a general challenge for the existing Norwegian industrial structure, while also 
playing the role of teacher and transmitter of new technology” (Engen, 2009: 204). 
5.2.1. Statoil’s capacity and willingness to transfer technology 
I have mentioned Wang et al‟s theory on how the amount of knowledge contributed by a 
foreign company is determined by that firm‟s capacity to transfer and by its willingness to 
transfer. Interviewees for this thesis seem to agree that Statoil has a relatively high capacity to 
transfer technological know-how, in that it has a sophisticated knowledge base and in that its 
expatriate employees possess the necessary technical and managerial skills to facilitate 
transfer. But Statoil‟s knowledge base, sophisticated as it may be, covers only certain parts of 
the petroleum technology spectrum, most notably deep-sea drilling and exploration which 
Statoil knows well from its home market. Also, as Hege Ebeltoft explained with her cup-and-
glass metaphor, Statoil generally does not possess specific technologies, but rather the 
knowledge of which technologies are best suited for different operational circumstances 
(Ebeltoft, interview, 2011). 
Professor Golan of NTNU, however, takes a somewhat different view. In his opinion, 
Statoil possesses a lot of valuable transferable technology, but “it has very limited expertise or 
resources to identify what is needed to be transferred and to solicit the goodwill of the 
custodians of the technology within Statoil” (Golan, correspondence, 2011). According to 
Professor Golan, Statoil‟s research division in Trondheim, which originally was meant to 
supervise the technology transfer programme to Venezuela, recognised Statoil‟s shortcomings 
and therefore asked NTNU to step in and manage the programme as an independent actor. It 
is, of course, interesting to take note of the divergence between Hege Ebeltoft as an insider 
and Michael Golan as an outsider, but at the same time, Professor Golan‟s observations are 
not necessarily valid for other parts of Statoil than the one programme he took part in. 
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When it comes to the willingness of a company to transfer technology or technological 
know-how, Wang et al suggest that it is contingent on how important the receiving party is 
perceived by the transferring party, on the ownership structure and on the relationship 
between the two parties. Interviews revealed that these factors are indeed relevant. We have 
seen, for example, how Statoil considered a good relationship to Sonangol as an essential 
demonstration of its long-term commitment to Angola, and therefore decided to take on the 
task as technological assistant on the Gimboa field. In the cases of Venezuela and Northwest 
Russia, the receiving party is students and universities more than firms, so the comparison is 
harder to make. But in both these cases, major local universities are recognised as highly 
important in developing the necessary knowledge base locally, so that local firms and local 
workers are able to compete for procurement contracts and jobs in the petroleum industry.  
When it comes to the ownership structure, oil and gas fields are almost exclusively 
developed through joint ventures, as different companies are awarded the rights to purchase a 
given share in the same field, and the relationship with the partner or partners then becomes a 
major determinant of willingness to transfer. Turning once again to the Gimboa field for an 
example, we saw that Statoil‟s willingness to transfer was strengthened by the fact that it 
considers Sonangol as an ally rather than as a competitor. 
Moreover, it became clear that in Statoil‟s case, there is also a fourth determinant of 
willingness to transfer, namely the potential to obtain shared benefits. In Professor Golan‟s 
opinion, Statoil as an organisation is not properly geared for technology transfer; technology 
transfer is not a company reflex (Golan, correspondence, 2011). Therefore, it is necessary to 
start technology transfer projects by searching for employees with relevant knowledge who 
are motivated to share their knowledge with a partner institution, and the potential for shared 
benefits apparently serves as a powerful motivator.  
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All of the Statoil employees I interviewed stressed the importance of finding a way for 
both parties in combined CSR and ITT projects to gain useful new insights, so that the 
projects can be seen as integrated parts of Statoil‟s business rather than pure philanthropy. In 
Venezuela and Northwest Russia, Statoil thus has a lot to learn about onshore petroleum 
operations, and in Angola we have seen how the technology cooperation agreement with 
Sonangol produced potentially lucrative information which gives the two parties a shared 
competitive advantage. We can see this fourth determinant as an illustration of what happens 
when one combines ITT and CSR. To Wang et al, whose article places itself squarely within 
the academic field of ITT, it was not necessary to specify the requirement to obtain shared 
benefits, since the mother firm‟s overarching motivation behind the technology transfer was 
always to increase its profits. But when adding elements of CSR, representatives of the 
mother firm, which in this case is Statoil, suddenly feel a need to specify that projects produce 
benefits for the mother firm as well, because without this specification CSR can easily be 
confused with charity. 
5.3. The Norwegian government: An active owner? 
The Norwegian government owns two thirds of Statoil, and with such a high ownership stake, 
one would not be surprised to learn that the government occasionally attempts to exert 
influence on the way Statoil conducts its business. Moreover, since 2005, Norway has had a 
centre-left government which at least rhetorically espouses active state ownership of certain 
companies. For these reasons, I initially assumed to find evidence of at least a certain degree 
of government interference in Statoil. Interviews revealed, however, that such interference is 
almost non-existent. This has got to do, first with the strategic goals that the government has 
for its ownership of Statoil, and second with the fact that Statoil‟s CSR and ITT programmes 
actually stretch further than what is required by government policies, thus eliminating the 
need for government interference. 
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A report to the Norwegian Parliament by the Ministry of Trade and Industry on active 
state ownership explains how the government organises its ownership portfolio in four 
categories: Category 1 is for companies for which the government has purely commercial 
purposes for its ownership. Category 2 is for companies with commercial purposes and the 
added purpose of maintaining strategically important head office functions in Norway. 
Category 3 is for companies with commercial purposes and other specifically defined 
purposes, whereas category 4 is for companies with sector political purposes (NHD, 2011). 
The level of government interference with the management of companies can roughly be said 
to be ascending with category numbers, meaning that the government is likely to be most 
directly involved with management of category 4 companies and remain passive to the largest 
possible extent when it comes to companies in category 1. Statoil is classified as a category 2 
company, so the explicit goals of the government‟s ownership are limited to earning money 
and assuring that Statoil‟s head offices remain in Norway. 
That being said, there is no reason to conclude that the Norwegian government‟s 
approach to ownership is compatible with Friedman‟s assertion that “the social responsibility 
of business is to increase its profits” (Friedman, 1970), and thus that social investments and 
technology transfer are irrelevant to CSR. In addition to the explicit strategic ownership goals, 
the government has also put forth a number of expectations and recommendations to 
companies it partly or wholly owns. For example, the ownership report states that Norwegian 
companies are expected to take a leading role in promoting CSR, and that “a strategic and 
high quality social responsibility contributes to a strengthening of companies‟ position and 
competitive stance in the long term. A state owner with clear expectations in this area will 
contribute to further professionalise such an effort” (NHD, 2011: 35). It is further noted how a 
responsible approach to business can reduce risks of undesirable incidents which can weaken 
the firm‟s reputation. These remarks suggest that the Norwegian government adopts a 
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resource-based view of the firm as mentioned by McWilliams et al (2006) and regards CSR as 
a potentially valuable and inimitable resource firms can use to strengthen their competitive 
stance.  
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has published a report which deals 
specifically with the topic of CSR in Norwegian companies, with or without government 
ownership. The report states that the government sees human rights, labour standards and 
working conditions, environmental concerns, corruption and transparency as central targets of 
CSR policies. It includes a bullet-point list of expectations to the private sector, which does 
not explicitly mention social investments or technology transfer. In fact, the report submits 
few requirements for genuinely active measures by companies; rather, it stresses compliance 
with principles on labour rights, environmental standards, anti-corruption and transparency. 
Still, the government issues a call on Norwegian companies to, among other things, increase 
investments in developing countries and “actively recruit staff locally in the host country, 
encourage the use of local suppliers and use local companies as contractors and suppliers in 
developing countries” (MFA, 2009: 13). These elements, as we have seen, are central to 
Statoil‟s combined ITT and CSR projects.  
All Norwegian companies are also encouraged to comply with the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises. Of the 10 main elements of these guidelines, one concerns 
science and technology in particular: “Enterprises should contribute to the transfer of 
technology and know-how to host countries and to the development of local and national 
innovative capacity. When appropriate, they should perform science and technology 
development work in host countries” (MFA, 2009: 29). Furthermore, the report demands that 
“CSR (...) be clearly established as a line management responsibility, and followed up on an 
ongoing basis by the company‟s senior management and board” (MFA, 2009: 7), which is 
completely in accordance with the way CSR is organised in Statoil. 
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When it comes to what kind of role government should be expected to play in 
business, it is noted that government‟s primary role is to take part in international cooperation 
and establish and maintain conventions on human rights, labour standards, environment, 
resource management, taxation, corruption and trade. Since intergovernmental cooperation 
has insufficient tools to ensure compliance with such conventions in all countries, CSR 
presents itself as an instrument to fill the holes in government‟s reach. Still, the report goes to 
great lengths to alleviate fears of a micro-managing government which interferes in the day-
to-day business of state owned companies: “When the state hives off enterprises as private 
limited companies, public limited companies or state-owned enterprises, they are no longer 
part of the public administration. This means that the state cannot manage these enterprises by 
administrative decision” (MFA, 2009: 16). At the limit, it is suggested that government might 
alter the composition of the board of a company which fails to incorporate CSR standards in 
its business operations.  
Having observed how the Norwegian government formulates its policies on CSR and 
active ownership, we turn now to regard how Statoil employees perceive – or, alternatively, 
do not perceive – their day-to-day work as influenced by the fact that the government is the 
majority owner of their company. It has been noted that profit-maximizing firms “often hold 
quite a contradictory perspective on technology transfer vis-a-vis that of the state, which is 
presumably seeking more diversified objectives” (Calantone et al., 1990: 34). If this assertion 
holds true for Statoil, one would expect to learn about employees frustrated by government 
demands perceived as unreasonable or in conflict with the object of profit maximisation. My 
interviews have, however, revealed quite the contrary: Statoil employees who work directly 
with technology transfer and CSR projects reported no government interference whatsoever, 
and those who are specifically assigned to work with government contacts say that the 
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government is an interested but completely passive interlocutor on CSR matters and that 
strategic and operational decisions are left entirely to Statoil‟s management. 
Hans-Aasmund Frisak, who is responsible for the part of Statoil‟s government 
contacts which concerns its international operations, interpreted the government‟s passive 
approach by the fact that “Statoil is in a different league”, in the sense that it does more than 
what the government expects when it comes to CSR (Frisak, interview, 2011). Government 
officials are often generalists with limited opportunities to specialise themselves in any given 
topic, whereas large corporations can afford to employ hundreds of staff who work only on 
CSR or ITT-related matters. This is one of the reasons why Statoil can remain in the forefront 
of government regulations and recommendations. As mentioned, Statoil‟s CSR reporting 
meets the highest possible standards according to both the GRI and the UN Global Compact 
indexes, and Statoil promotes the EITI in all countries in which it operates.  
Encouraged by its auditor Ernst & Young, Statoil has also taken the initiative to 
annual meetings with the ownership division of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and 
representatives from the Ministry of Trade and Industry to present the sustainability report. 
Moreover, Statoil participates several times a year in a dialogue arena under the auspices of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where corporations meet with bureaucrats and NGOs to 
discuss CSR policies. As Frisak emphasised, though, all of these meetings take place on a 
bureaucratic and not a political level, and Statoil has no formal CSR dialogue with Norwegian 
politicians. This is not to say that politicians are uninterested in CSR. On the contrary, both 
Hans-Aasmund Frisak and Benedikt Henriksen explained that CSR-related questions are often 
brought up during their informal meetings with politicians, but Frisak also confirmed that 
politicians rarely make requests that are challenging for Statoil to accommodate and that 
technology transfer is rarely, if ever, discussed in such settings. 
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Professor Golan of NTNU once again provided an interesting vantage point from 
outside Statoil. In Venezuela, he observed that the driving force behind the technology 
transfer projects was Statoil, and in particular Statoil‟s local employees, while the Norwegian 
government was totally absent (Golan, correspondence, 2011). But he also explained that in 
Azerbaijan, he and his colleagues worked with the Norwegian ambassador to promote 
technology transfer and develop a programme along the lines of the inter-university 
collaboration in Venezuela. In that case, according to Professor Golan, the ambassador was 
enthusiastic, but Statoil‟s local CSR branch did not respond positively. Given the positive 
experience from Venezuela, one could imagine that Statoil‟s central CSR staff would order, 
or at least strongly encourage, the Azerbaijani branch to develop a technology transfer 
programme. However, since CSR is a line responsibility in Statoil, the authority to initiate 
such projects lies exclusively with the country offices. The Norwegian ambassador to Baku‟s 
espousal of a technology transfer programme remains the only example I have come across of 
government officials attempting to exert influence on Statoil‟s operations. 
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Chapter 6: Concluding remarks 
6.1. The research questions 
We have seen examples of how international technology transfer and corporate social 
responsibility can combine as academic fields and how Statoil uses these two business 
functions in an overlapping manner. Even though they overlap within Statoil, however, the 
company has no specified policies for how, when or indeed why they should be combined, 
nor are there any ongoing strategic processes in Statoil aimed at developing best practices for 
the combination of the two. When asked to reflect upon advantages of combining CSR and 
ITT, Statoil employees with a CSR background tend to think of ITT as a way to disperse 
benefits more broadly, whereas those with a primarily technology related background tend to 
appreciate the structured mechanisms for control and reporting that CSR offers. 
When attempting to answer the first research question of this thesis, which is 
concerned with identifying unique features of combined CSR and ITT projects, the term 
technology must be understood in a much wider sense than just physical artefacts. Statoil‟s 
technology transfer projects involve knowledge sharing, competence building and explaining 
the functioning of specific pieces of machinery, and they are usually mutual learning 
processes rather than a one-way transfer of know-how. Provided that one allows for the 
necessary conceptual flexibility and accepts open boundaries between the terms “knowledge 
sharing” and “technology transfer”, the question can still be answered.  
For one thing, employees working with CSR are almost surprisingly eager to 
underline that CSR is neither altruism, nor charity, but rather a way of seeing social concerns 
as part of the companies‟ core activities and to create value for external stakeholders as well 
as for Statoil‟s own shareholders. Technology – or more accurately technological know-how 
– is one of Statoil‟s core strategic assets, so doing technology transfer in a mutually beneficial 
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way should then equate good non-altruistic CSR. We have also seen how the coupling of one 
of the two functions with the other can serve as an attenuator of what could be called intra-
team zeal. A CSR team can be eagerly convinced of the benefits of a project, and fail to 
realise that the expected positive outcomes may favour an unnecessarily narrow group. An 
ITT team can be too stubborn in its expectations of immediate benefits flowing back to 
Statoil, and thus abort a project which could create significant value for external stakeholders. 
If we invoke the terminological distinction between strategic, coerced and altruistic 
CSR (Hockerts and Morsing, 2008), it appears fitting to describe Statoil‟s approach to CSR as 
strategic, with certain elements of coercion. In many ways, Statoil uses CSR as a risk 
management tool, in that it intends for social investments, technology transfer, labour rights 
and health, safety and environmental standards to mitigate the risks of negative publicity. In a 
business as heavily politicised as the oil business, a company which is negatively perceived 
by influential external stakeholders can experience to be left out of licensing rounds and thus 
effectively out of business. Statoil employees definitely see CSR as a potential competitive 
advantage. If Statoil can do CSR better than its competitors, they hope, it stands to gain 
essential political rewards from regulatory authorities. In some cases, Statoil is also coerced 
into adopting CSR measures, like we have seen most notably in Sub-Saharan Africa where 
exploration licences frequently come with attached requirements for a certain amount of 
social investments. 
 
The second research question sheds light on ways in which Statoil is influenced by its 
history. First of all, Statoil is used to learning. In terms of technological know-how about 
petroleum operations it started from next to nothing in the early 1970s and had by the end of 
I find hypothesis H1 to be only partially confirmed. Statoil employees do consider ITT an 
efficient way to meet CSR targets, and they also appreciate the structure and planning 
that the CSR component often adds to ITT projects. There is, however, no clear strategy 
within Statoil on how to couple the two business functions. 
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the 1980s acquired sufficient skills to independently conduct exploration, development and 
operation of oil and gas fields in Norway. In the 1990s, Statoil was the junior member of an 
alliance with BP, with the objective of acquiring the know-how necessary to operate 
independently outside Norway as well. While its technological know-how was initially 
limited, Statoil was, however, backed by a competent Norwegian state bureaucracy with 
experience in controlling large foreign firms‟ role in the extraction of natural resources from 
when Norway developed its hydropower resources in the early 1900s.  
Today, Statoil sees technology transfer as a strategic asset, and endeavours to create a 
narrative of itself as a benevolent partner for other oil companies and a willing contributor of 
knowledge. The message Statoil attempts to get across to regulators in the countries where it 
wishes to set up operations can roughly be transcribed as “we have learnt, we know that 
learning is important, and we are now ready and willing to teach”. Even though there are good 
strategic and political reasons for Statoil to communicate this kind of story about itself, there 
is also no doubt that individual Statoil employees are genuinely motivated by opportunities to 
create shared value and to, through technology transfer, see their company‟s core business 
benefit external stakeholders as well. All the interviewees for this thesis seemed very aware of 
and proud of their company‟s history and indeed of the Norwegian petroleum history as such.  
In Wang et al‟s terminology, Statoil is both capable and willing to transfer technology, 
but the capability is limited to certain parts of petroleum technology, and the willingness is 
contingent on expectations of future political rewards. As for Bozeman‟s proposed criteria for 
measuring technology transfer effectiveness, we saw that Statoil employees‟ reflections 
around the concept in practice often resembled the “out-the-door” criterion. Still, they also 
mentioned evaluation along the lines of “human capital”, “political reward” and “market 
impact” criteria. 
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On a critical note, it could be claimed that if Statoil was really intent on using its 
history to promote technology transfer, it should establish a central unit with the authority to 
initiate and oversee ITT projects with a visible CSR component. The unit International 
Industrial Development was a step in this direction, but it was only given a coordinating role 
and did not have the power to go against country managers. The principle of decentralisation 
appears to be strong in Statoil, and it seems unlikely that similar centralising initiatives will be 
attempted in the near future. 
 
The third research question is directed at the Norwegian government‟s real or 
perceived influence on Statoil in matters related to CSR and ITT. In fact, such influence is 
practically non-existent. Of the Statoil employees I interviewed, only two had been in direct 
contact with representatives of the Norwegian government
19
, and not one of them had 
experienced specific suggestions or demands from the representatives. Statoil is engaged in 
constant dialogue with government officials, both informally and through official networks, 
but the dialogue seems to take the form of Statoil sharing information, rather than government 
officials instructing Statoil. Bureaucrats and ministers alike express interest in CSR but are 
either unwilling to take a more hands-on approach, or – recalling Hans-Aasmund Frisak‟s 
observation that Statoil actually has a more sophisticated knowledge of CSR than government 
officials – simply do not consider it necessary. The coupling of CSR with ITT seems to be 
completely off the government‟s radar; no interviewee could remember a government official 
expressing interest in the matter. 
                                                 
19
 The two were Hans-Aasmund Frisak, who is specifically in charge of government contacts, and Benedikt 
Henriksen, who works in Russia, a neighbouring country of Norway whose friendship is a central piece in the 
current Norwegian government‟s foreign policy. 
I find hypothesis H2 to be confirmed. Statoil employees are conscious about their 
company’s history and eager to contribute to international technology transfer, albeit 
with other motives than pure technological altruism. 
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Such a passive government role may appear surprising, given that 67% of Statoil is 
owned by the Norwegian state and given that Statoil was originally set up with the purpose of 
ensuring the maximum rate of returns on petroleum resources to Norwegian state coffers. The 
Statoil of today is, however, very different from the Statoil of the 1970s. First, it has been 
partially privatised and the government has explicitly declared that its sole purposes of 
owning Statoil are to make money and to ensure that strategically important head office 
functions remain in Norway. Second, Statoil‟s ambitions are no longer limited to the 
Norwegian continental shelf but stretch globally.  
On a purely speculative note, one could argue that the government exerts influence on 
Statoil simply by being the majority owner and that Statoil would be less concerned with CSR 
measures if it were fully privatised. The Ministry of Trade and Industry‟s recent white paper 
(NHD, 2011) stresses that state owned companies are expected to take a leading role in 
promoting CSR, and one could hardly imagine that the government would have remained 
silent if Statoil were to abolish its CSR efforts altogether. CSR, at the same time, is not unique 
to Statoil but something all the international oil companies have either wanted or felt obliged 
to integrate into their business operations, so it seems safe to assume that Statoil‟s CSR 
programmes are the result of business considerations rather than indirect pressure from its 
most important owner. 
When Statoil expands abroad, it can therefore largely expect the Norwegian political 
apparatus to give it free hands to stake out its own path based on pure business considerations. 
However, Statoil and all other international oil companies must navigate a heavily politicized 
environment in host countries. We have seen how Statoil carefully nurtures its relationship to 
Sonangol in the hope of future licences, how the problematic diplomatic relationship between 
Norway and Venezuela creates problems for Statoil there, and how Statoil in Northwest 
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Russia is completely dependent on a constructive dialogue with politicians in order to conduct 
their operations. 
 
This assertion deserves a remark, since I have not conducted interviews with 
representatives of the Norwegian government, and since it is fully imaginable that, on a direct 
question, they would answer that they do indeed have high expectations to Statoil when it 
comes to both CSR and ITT. The important observation in this context nevertheless remains 
that no such expectations are noticed within Statoil and, accordingly, it is valid to assert that 
the Norwegian government does not influence Statoil‟s CSR and ITT programmes. 
6.2. Methodological remarks 
George and Bennett underlined that “case explanations must always be considered to be of a 
provisional character. Therefore, the (...) conclusions drawn from case study findings will also 
be provisional” (George and Bennett, 2005: 90). Accordingly, the findings of this thesis 
should in no way be understood to be of a permanent character. For example, there can be no 
doubt that the Norwegian government, as the majority owner of Statoil, is legally empowered 
to instruct Statoil in matters related to CSR and ITT and that, as a consequence, the answer to 
research question R3 may in the future be of a very different kind. Statoil is also nearing an 
age when all its employees who already worked for the company in its early years will be 
retired, and this may have implications for how history influences its attitudes to ITT. 
George and Bennett further stress that “an investigator must demonstrate that he or she 
has seriously considered alternative explanations for the case outcome in order to avoid 
providing the basis for a suspicion, justified or not, that he or she has “imposed” a favoured 
I find hypothesis H3 to be refuted with regards to bureaucrats and politicians of the 
Norwegian government, as they do not appear to have specific expectations to how Statoil 
meets its CSR targets, nor do they appear to explicitly encourage Statoil to engage in ITT. 
However, I find the hypothesis to be confirmed with regards to regulatory authorities in 
Angola, Russia and Venezuela. 
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theory hypothesis as the explanation” (George and Bennett, 2005: 91). I hope to have 
demonstrated the ability to consider alternative explanations throughout the analytical and 
concluding chapters, for example by admitting that I initially assumed that the Norwegian 
government would administer its ownership of Statoil much more actively. 
I have only conducted research within one firm, and I have used only three of the 
numerous cases within Statoil which can be said to contain elements of both ITT and CSR. 
Still, after having received written or verbal input from eight persons with hands-on 
experience from ITT and CSR projects, one of whom is not a Statoil employee, and after 
having also to some extent made use of newspaper articles, Statoil‟s web pages and, of 
course, relevant academic background literature, I believe that there is a sufficient amount of 
diversity in the viewpoints I present for me to be able to conduct a sensible analysis of the 
empirical findings.  
Above all, I hope to have illustrated that it is fruitful to study how international 
technology transfer and corporate social responsibility interact and affect each other. As 
academic fields, the two are often concerned with finding solutions to similar problems and as 
concurrent business functions, they tend to make for a more organised process with more 
wide-reaching effects than when they are kept isolated. Future studies could advantageously 
include more than one company, preferably also from more than one country, in order to 
unveil differences and similarities in how ITT and CSR are carried out. If further qualitative 
studies repeatedly indicate that the two business functions do have meaningful interaction 
across a spectre of firms and countries, quantitative methods could be employed to 
investigate, for example, how many CSR projects include elements of ITT, how the long-term 
earning potential of a company is affected by determined use of ITT and CSR, or whether the 
effects on the host community of CSR projects with an ITT component are indeed dispersed 
more broadly than other CSR projects, as has been suggested in this thesis.  
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Appendix I: Acronyms and abbreviations 
AfDB: African Development Bank 
ANHEI: Angola-Norway Higher Education Initiative 
CSR: Corporate social responsibility 
EITI: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
ESST: European science, society and technology 
GRI: Global Reporting Initiative 
IID: International industrial development (formerly a unit in Statoil) 
INT: Colloquial designation of what was formerly Statoil‟s division for international 
exploration and production 
ITT: International technology transfer 
KPI: Key performance indicator 
LDC: Least developed county 
MFA: (Norwegian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MNC: Multinational corporation 
MTT: Management and Technology Transfer Programme (former Statoil programme in 
Angola) 
NGO: Non-governmental organisation 
NHD: Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry (Nærings- og Handelsdepartementet) 
NOC: National oil company 
Norad: Norwegian Agency for Development and Cooperation 
NTNU: Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
RIAN: RIA Novosti (Russian International News Agency) 
SDAG: Shtokman Development AG 
STS: Science and technology studies 
TCA: Technology cooperation agreement 
UAN: Universidade Agostinho Neto, Angola 
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme 
UNECA: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
USB: Universidad Simón Bolívar, Venezuela 
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Appendix II: Interview guide 
Please describe your role and responsibilities in Statoil and your experience with CSR and/or 
ITT-related projects. 
Are you aware of ongoing or finished strategic thinking in Statoil aimed at specifying ways of 
combining the use of CSR and ITT? 
What are the reasons for Statoil to have a CSR policy? 
Do you feel demand from external actors to conduct your CSR efforts in a certain way? If yes, 
from who or from which organisation(s)/institution(s)? (If the interviewee does not mention it 
himself/herself, ask specifically about Norwegian authorities, local authorities, NGOs and 
public opinion) 
What is your definition (or, less formally, your understanding) of technology? 
Who is the recipient of technology in ITT projects you have been involved in? Public sector? 
Local NOC? NGO? 
Can you try to describe as accurately as possible what is being transferred? 
What criteria do you use to measure the effectiveness of ITT and CSR projects? (After the 
interviewee’s initial reflection, present Bozeman’s six suggested criteria and ask if any of 
them fit well with the actual situation in Statoil.) 
How does Statoil‟s history influence your/your company‟s views on technology transfer? 
How would you describe Statoil‟s capacity to transfer technology? 
How would you describe Statoil‟s willingness to transfer technology? 
In your view, what distinguishes combined ITT and CSR projects from projects with only one 
of these components? 
 
 
